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TYING PRIVACY IN KNOTTS: BEEPER MONITORING AND
COLLECTIVE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Advances in police surveillance techniques have generated confusion
over the interpretation of the fourth amendment prohibition against un-
reasonable searches and seizures.1 Equipped with new technology, state
and federal law enforcement officials are now capable of making unprece-
dented invasions of individuals' privacy expectations.2 One such device,
an electronic tracking instrument known as a beeper,3 has led to inconsis-
I The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
2 The fourth amendment jurisprudence addressing the use of such technologies has a rich
history. In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Supreme Court held that
wiretapping of a private line was not a fourth amendment search because it did not involve
a physical trespass. The Court abandoned the trespass distinction in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967), and held that electronic eavesdropping of a phone conversation was a
search because it violated the "privacy upon which [defendant] justifiably relied." Id. at
353. The Court nevertheless has been reluctant to read Katz expansively in other cases
involving technological surveillance. See, e.g., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (use of
flashlight to look through car window not a search); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
(use of pen registers not a search); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (use of bug
on a participant in a conversation with his consent not a search).
Lower courts addressing the fourth amendment implications of other technologically ad-
vanced devices have reached varied conclusions. See, e.g., United States v. Ward, 703 F.2d
1058 (8th Cir. 1983) (use of nightscope not a search); United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d
131 (2d Cir. 1980) (use of telescope to see inside home is a search); United States v. Haynie,
637 F.2d 227 (4th Cir.) (use of x-ray scanner is a search), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1980);
United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799 (2d Cir. 1974) (use of magnetometer is a search);
State v. Kender, 60 Hawaii 301, 588 P.2d 447 (1979) (use of telescope to view curtilage is a
search); People v. Ferguson, 47 Ill. App. 3d 654, 365 N.E.2d 77 (1977) (use of binoculars to
see inside home not a search); State v. Denton, 387 So.2d 578 (La. 1980) (use of nightscope
not a search); People v. Dezek, 107 Mich. App. 78, 308 N.W.2d 652 (1981) (videotape in
bathroom stalls is a search); Sponick v. City of Detroit Police Dep't, 49 Mich. App. 162, 211
N.W.2d 674 (1973) (videotape in bar not a search); Commonwealth v. Williams, 494 Pa. 496,
431 A.2d 964 (1981) (use of startron to view inside of apartment is a search); Commonwealth
v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970) (use of binoculars to see inside office not
a search).
3 "A beeper is a radio transmitter, usually battery operated, which emits periodic signals
that can be picked up by a radio receiver." United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 277
(1983). Beepers do not intercept the contents of any wire or oral communication and there-
fore do not fall under the federal wiretap statute, 18 U S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1982). See State
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tent decisions in the lower federal courts regarding the precise nature of
fourth amendment privacy interests in this context.4 The United States
Supreme Court held in United States v. Knotts5 that police monitoring
of beeper signals from an object did not constitute a fourth amendment
search or seizure where the object was located either in an automobile
traveling along public roads or on private land.' Knotts is the first Su-
preme Court opinion addressing fourth amendment issues arising from
the use of electronic tracking devices. As such, it provides an opportunity
for criticizing the Court's approach to these issues in light of the princi-
ples underlying the prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures.7
v. Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 250 S.E.2d 872 (1979). For more information on beeper
technology, see Dowling, "Bumper Beepers" and the Fourth Amendment, 13 Crim. L. Bull.
266, 266-67 (1977) ("A radio direction finder operates on the principle that whenever an
electromagnetic wave is generated, antennae can determine the direction of origin of the
wave. The reception angles of two antennae may be jointly used to triangulate the location
of the broadcast source.")
I See, e.g., United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (warrantless monitoring
of beeper in chemical canister located in private residence no violation of privacy interests),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252 (5th Cir.) (war-
rantless installation of beeper on vehicle located in public place no violation), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v. Curtis, 562 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1977) (warrantless
installation of transponder on airplane no violation where officers probable cause); United
States v. Holmes, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (warrantless installation of
beeper on vehicle in public place violation where no probable cause existed); see also infra
notes 18-28, 36-40 and accompanying text (describing the confusion in the lower courts over
the fourth amendment implications of beeper use).
The controversy has generated numerous articles. See, e.g., Carr, Electronic Beepers, 4
Search & Seizure L. Rep., Apr. 1977 No. 4; Marks & Batey, Electronic Tracking Devices:
Fourth Amendment Problems and Solutions, 67 Ky. L.J. 987 (1979); Note, Electronic
Tracking Devices and Privacy: See No Evil, Hear No Evil, But Beware of Trojan Horses, 9
Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 227 (1977); Note, Finders Keepers, Beepers Weepers: United States v.
Knotts-A Realistic Approach to Beeper Use and the Fourth Amendment, 27 St. Louis
U.L.J. 483 (1983); Comment, Fourth Amendment Implications of Electronic Tracking De-
vices, 46 U. Cin. L. Rev. 243 (1977); Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and the
Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. Ill. L.F. 1167; Note, Tracking Devices and the
Fourth Amendment, 13 U.S.F.L. Rev. 203 (1978); Note, Tracking Katz: Beepers, Privacy,
and the Fourth Amendment, 86 Yale L.J. 1461 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Yale Note]; Re-
cent Cases, Search and Seizure-Attachment of a Tracking Device to Automobile Consti-
tutes a Search Subject to Fourth Amendment, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 514 (1976); Recent Develop-
ments, Does Installation of an Electronic Tracking Device Constitute a Search Subject to
the Fourth Amendment?, 22 Vill. L. Rev. 1067 (1977).
5 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
6 Id. at 281-82, 285.
1 See infra notes 41-91 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court subsequently ad-
dressed the constitutionality of beeper use in United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 13-17 and 29-35. This note focuses on Knotts, how-
ever, as a vehicle for exploring the importance of collective rights in resolving technological
Beeper Monitoring
This note examines the primary issues addressed by electronic tracking
law and then criticizes Knotts. First, it surveys electronic tracking law
and discusses the fourth amendment implications of beeper use. This dis-
cussion of federal and state court decisions illustrates the confusion in the
lower courts and underscores the effect of Knotts on electronic tracking
law. In Part II, the note analyzes Knotts under a conventional individual
rights approach and concludes that, despite problems with the reasoning
in Knotts, the individual rights analysis confirms the permissibility of
warrantless vehicle tracking as analogous to conventional police tailing.
Part III argues that, even assuming the legitimacy of the Knotts individ-
ual rights analysis, extensive beeper use significantly threatens the pri-
vacy interests of society as a collective body, in violation of the fourth
amendment. In reaching this conclusion it evaluates the importance of
the privacy of public movement, the psychological need for anonymity
and solitude, and the political significance of an unencumbered right to
travel. Predicated upon a less conventional reading of the fourth amend-
ment that embraces collective privacy rights, this approach seeks to pro-
tect society as a whole from governmental misconduct. Finally, Part IV
applies the collective privacy rights analysis to three remaining issues
where electronic tracking devices implicate fourth amendment concerns.
I. ELECTRONIC TRACKING DEVICES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Whether electronic tracking constitutes a fourth amendment search or
seizure depends initially on whether such surveillance invades an individ-
ual's "legitimate expectation of privacy."' Most courts applying this stan-
dard have recognized a distinction between beeper installation and subse-
quent monitoring of the device.' This bifurcated analysis, recently
adopted by the Supreme Court,'0 reflects the difference between privacy
expectations affected by beeper installation and those affected by moni-
surveillance issues.
8 The Supreme Court adopted the privacy expectations test in Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967). In Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979), the Court added the re-
quirement that the privacy expectation be reasonable, an element first suggested by Justice
Harlan in his Katz concurrence. 389 U.S. at 361. As the Court stated in United States v.
Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), "A 'search' occurs 'when an expectation of privacy that society
is prepared to consider reasonable is infringed.'" Id. at 3302 (quoting United States v. Ja-
cobsen, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1656 (1984)).
' See infra text accompanying notes 18-28 and 37-40 (lower court cases discussing instal-
lation and monitoring issues separately).
10 United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3301-07 (1984); see also United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 279 (1983) (tacitly accepting the bifurcated analysis of beeper use under the
fourth amendment). For criticism of this analysis, see 1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure §
2.7, at 420 (1978).
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toring. Installation implicates the expectation that one's possessions will
remain secure, while monitoring confronts an expectation that certain in-
formation will remain secret.11
Application of fourth amendment analysis by the lower courts to the
beeper controversy has yielded inconsistent and confusing results. This
section analyzes fourth amendment case law, considering in turn the is-
sues of beeper installation and monitoring, and concludes with an exami-
nation of United States v. Knotts,2 where the Supreme Court held that
public monitoring is not a search.
A. Beeper Installation
1. United States v. Karo: Installation Before Transfer
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Karo" that the transfer
of a beeper-laden object from an informant to respondent was not a
search or seizure. 4 The transfer neither conveyed information respondent
' See United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3311 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
'3 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984). The facts are found id. at 3300-01. Karo involved beeper surveil-
lance of persons suspected of dealing in cocaine by Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agents. The DEA learned that respondent Karo (and others) had ordered 50 gallons
of ether, used to extract cocaine from clothing imported into the United States, from a
government informant. With the consent of the informant, the agents obtained a court order
authorizing the installation and monitoring of a beeper in one of the ether cans.
The agents observed as Karo picked up the ether from the informant; they then followed
Karo to his home, using both visual and beeper surveillance. Using only the beeper, the
agents determined that the ether remained in Karo's home for a period of time, and that it
was later moved to another location. After respondents transferred the beeper-laden can to
several storage facilities, the DEA agents followed two vehicles, one of which carried the can
with the beeper, by visual and electronic surveillance. The vehicles arrived at a house in
Taos, and the agents did not maintain visual surveillance. The next day the vehicles left
Taos, but the agents, using the beeper, determined that the ether remained in the house.
When they suspected that respondents were extracting the cocaine from the clothing with
the ether, the agents obtained a warrant to search the Taos residence. The warrant was
executed, based in part on information derived from the beeper, and the agents seized the
cocaine and laboratory equipment and arrested the respondents.
14 Karo reached the same result as the vast majority of lower court cases had before. See
United States v. Braithwaite, 709 F.2d 1450, 1454 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Brock,
667 F.2d 1311, 1319 n.4 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v.
Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 943 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1388 (5th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981); United States v. Devorce, 526 F. Supp. 191,
199-200 (D. Conn. 1981); United States v. Stephenson, 490 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D. Mich.
1979); United States v. French, 414 F. Supp 800, 803 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Dunivant v. State,
155 Ga. App. 884, 273 S.E.2d 621, 625 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998 (1981). As was the
case in Karo, these decisions involved fact situations where the government was in posses-
sion of the property at the time of installation or a third party consented to installing the
electronic device. But see United States v. Karo, 710 F.2d 1433, 1438 (10th Cir. 1983) ("All
[Vol. 71:297
Beeper Monitoring
wished to keep private nor interfered with his possessory interests in a
meaningful way.15 The Karo Court noted that the "mere transfer of a can
containing an unmonitored beeper infringed no privacy interest. It con-
veyed no information that Karo wished to keep private, for it conveyed
no information at all."' 6
The installation inquiry thus rested on the Court's conception of the
constitutionally protected privacy interest in this setting-namely, the
expectation of individuals that certain information will remain secret and
free from governmental intrusion. Even assuming this conception of indi-
vidual privacy expectations is sound, 7 it remains unclear whether beeper
installation under different circumstances constitutes a fourth amend-
ment search. The Court may yet be required to resolve whether installa-
tion is a search or seizure when it is accomplished with greater privacy
intrusion.
2. The Lower Courts: Installation Involving Greater Intrusion
The lower federal and state courts face a myriad of fact situations when
addressing the constitutionality of nonconsensual beeper installation. Dis-
agreements result from the difficult and controversial nature of electronic
individuals have a legitimate expectation of privacy that objects coming into their rightful
ownership do not have electronic devices attached to them .... "), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 3296
(1984); State v. Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 258 S.E.2d 872 (1979); see also United States
v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977) ("the important factor seems to be not that there
was or was not a common law trespass ab initio, but that a homing device was surrepti-
tiously implanted in private property in order to enhance the agents' ability to shadow the
property and its possessors"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
15 The Court held that "[i]t is clear that the actual placement of the beeper into the can
violated no one's Fourth Amendment rights." 104 S. Ct. at 3301. This conclusion was based
primarily on the fact that Karo had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the can because,
at the time of installation, the can belonged to the DEA. Moreover, the Court argued, even
if the can did not actually belong to the government, the consent of the third party owner to
install the device "was sufficient to validate the placement of the beeper in the can." Id.
Hence, Karo leaves open the question of whether mere installation constitutes a search or
seizure where no third party consent is involved. See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying
text.
16 Id. at 3302.
11 Justice Stevens, of course, disagreed with the majority's conception of privacy. See
supra note 16. In essence, his dissent argued that the installation of the beeper constituted a
seizure under the fourth amendment: "When the Government attaches an electronic moni-
toring device to that property, it infringes [the owner's] exclusionary right; in a fundamental
sense it has converted the property to its own use." 104 S. Ct. at 3311 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Stevens thus focused on the intrusiveness of the government action on the property
rights of the individual. This note argues that, under an approach that embraces the collec-
tive privacy rights of society, beeper installation represents less of a threat to those rights
than does the subsequent monitoring of electronic tracking devices. See infra notes 182-92
and accompanying text.
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tracking issues.'5 By and large, lower courts, seeking to avoid direct con-
flicts by distinguishing between different types of electronic surveil-
lance,19 merely render narrow holdings and avoid the broader philosophi-
cal problems generated by beeper surveillance. Consequently, there is no
consistent approach to adjudicating fourth amendment rights in this
context.
Lower court treatment of the installation issue tends to focus on the
individual's possessory interest in the object at the time the beeper is
installed.20 Where police attach a beeper to the exterior of an automobile
in a public place, courts generally agree that a "technical trespass" has
occurred but disagree as to whether a search has taken place and, if so,
what standard should govern." Some lower courts further complicate the
problem by substituting their own approach" or by avoiding the search
19 As one court observed:
At the root of the debate is the philosophical question of whether our sense of pri-
vacy, and the protection afforded it by the Constitution, does and should adjust to
technological advances.
With due respect for the complexity of this issue we limit our decision to the pre-
cise issue before us ....
United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1196 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 941 (6th Cir. 1980) (beeper surveillance
of non-contraband personal property in private areas is search); United States v. Bruneau,
594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir.) (transponder monitoring of airplane not a search), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir. 1978)
(beeper indicating both location and status of package not a search).
2 Before United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984), the lower court decisions address-
ing this issue fell roughly into three categories: those cases involving no trespass against the
defendant, those involving a technical trespass only, and those cases where beeper installa-
tion constitutes a substantial trespass. The Court noted in Karo, however, that "an actual
trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation," 104 S. Ct.
at 3302, and in resolving the installation issue it focused on the reasonableness of the as-
serted expectation of privacy and not the intrusiveness of the government trespass. See
supra note 17. Thus, in the future, lower courts may shift their analysis away from the
concern with trespass.
21 See United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 257-58 (5th Cir.) (en banc) ("reasonable
suspicion" adequate to support warrantless beeper installation under "dual privacy and in-
trusiveness" analysis), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 956 (1981); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d
106 (1st Cir. 1977) ("probable cause" necessary and sufficient to support warrantless beeper
attachment), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517
(9th Cir. 1976) (exterior attachment in a public place is not a substantial intrusion and
therefore not a search); United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 864 (5th Cir. 1975) (requir-
ing a warrant; "the installation of an electronic tracking device on a motor vehicles is a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"), aff'd by an equally divided court,
537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (en banc).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 950 (1981) (adopting a "dual privacy and intrusiveness analysis").
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question altogether."3
Moreover, a slight change in the fact situation often results in a differ-
ent analysis and a different conclusion. Beeper installation is a more seri-
ous trespass when police enter a vehicle, or open a container, to attach a
beeper. Several courts have held that such action constitutes a search.
24
This conclusion, however, turns on such factors as the contents of the
container,25 the unusual status of automobiles and airplanes under the
fourth amendment, 6 and the ownership of the vehicle or packageY.2  Be-
cause the police often obtain either a valid warrant or the owner's prior
consent, the courts in many cases never reach the question whether inte-
rior installation is a search.2
13 See, e.g., United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
908 (1979) (finding that probable cause and exigent circumstances obviated the decision
whether installation was a search); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977) (same).
" See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1147 (5th Cir. 1983) (interior of air-
plane), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 729 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 181 (1984); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.) (agents entered
garage and opened hood to install beeper) (dictum), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976);
United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp. 146 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (agents entered airplane through
locked door).
" When a lawful inspection reveals that the contents are contraband, the subsequent in-
stallation of a beeper is not a search. See, e.g., United States v. Botero, 589 F.2d 430 (9th
Cir. 1978) (handbag shipment containing cocaine), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944 (1979); United
States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1978) (mail package containing cocaine);
United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1978) (mail package containing heroin);
United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887 (1st Cir. 1976) (mail packages containing cocaine).
2" The automobile exception to the warrant requirement is based on the assertion that
individuals experience a "diminished expectation of privacy" in their cars. See S. Saltzburg,
American Criminal Procedure 230-31 (1984). Although the presumption of a diminished pri-
vacy expectation provides further justification for permitting the warrantless installation of
electronic tracking devices under the fourth amendment, some courts have managed to dis-
associate (or at least distinguish) the automobile exception from the installation of a beeper
in a car. See, e.g., United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139, 1148-50 (5th Cir. 1983) (warrant
requirement for beeper installation justified because such governmental action constitutes
"a continuing intrusion" of the privacy expectations of the individual), rev'd on other
grounds on rehearing, 729 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984).
2' See, e.g., United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir.) (consent of owner of
car sufficient to satisfy fourth amendment), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States
v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir.) (defendant lacked standing to challenge installation
of beeper because not owner of the car), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 896 (1978).
21 See United States v. Cady, 651 F.2d 290, 291 (5th Cir. 1981) (assuming without decid-
ing that interior installation is a search and then finding authorization by valid warrant),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir.)
(although installation "could potentially violate" fourth amendment, analysis unnecessary
because airplane's owner consented to installation), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979). See
also infra note 162 (documenting police use of warrants).
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B. Beeper Monitoring of Private Places
The Supreme Court held in United States v. Karo29 that the monitor-
ing of a beeper in a private residence not open to visual surveillance vio-
lates the fourth amendment rights of individuals who have a justifiable
interest in the privacy of the residence.30 In Karo, federal agents tracked
a beeper-laden can while suspects moved it from one house to another.
According to the majority, the monitoring of the beeper in a private resi-
dence is analogous to the warrantless search of a home and therefore is an
unreasonable search under the fourth amendment.3 1 The Court concluded
that beeper monitoring of a private residence is a search and therefore
must be authorized by a warrant.3 2 According to the majority,
"[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of property that has been withdrawn from
public view would present far too serious a threat to privacy interests in
the home to escape entirely some sort of Fourth Amendment oversight. 3
This conclusion depends primarily on the fact that officers monitored
the beeper to obtain information from inside a private residence. Since it
is well established that individuals in their homes deserve privacy free of
governmental intrusion not authorized by warrant,34 beeper monitoring in
this context deserves fourth amendment protection. The question re-
mains whether monitoring is a search in any situation where an individ-
ual withdraws from public view the beeper-laden object.35 In short, Karo
may raise as many questions as it settles.
29 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
'0 Id. at 3303-04. The Court in Karo resolved a split in the circuits. Some courts had
reasoned that warrantless monitoring of a beeper located in a house violates the fourth
amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 944 (6th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 113 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); State v.
Hendricks, 43 N.C. App. 245, 258 S.E.2d 872 (1979); see also United States v. Karo, 710
F.2d 1433, 1439 (10th Cir. 1983) (a beeper in a private residence provides "law enforcement
officials information that could not be discovered by ordinary visual surveillance, even had
that surveillance been constant"), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984). But see
United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1982) (residence monitoring a "mini-
mal intrusion" and hence not a search), cert. denied, 40 U.S. 1022 (1983); United States v.
Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 706 (9th Cir. 1983) (following Brock).
31 104 S. Ct. at 3302-05.
32 Id. at 3304-05. The government argued in Karo that, even assuming beeper monitoring
in this context is a search under the fourth amendment, a showing of "reasonable suspicion"
rather than "probable cause" should suffice to support the execution of a warrant. The
Court, however, declined to resolve this question, presumably leaving probable cause as the
required standard. Id. at 3305 n.5.
22 Id. at 3304 (footnote omitted); see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
24 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (the fourth amendment prohibits war-
rantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home to make a routine felony arrest); John-
son v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) (requiring warrant for search of home).
35 See supra note 16. It would be possible to distinquish between one's residence and, for
example, a commercial building. See, e.g., United States v. Clayborne, 584 F.2d 346, 351
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C. United States v. Knotts: Public Monitoring Allowed
Before the Supreme Court decided United States v. Knotts,386 the lower
courts reached disparate results in deciding the fourth amendment impli-
cations of electronic monitoring of public movement. Many courts con-
cluded that tracking an aircraft's airborne location is not a search.37 Cases
addressing automobile monitoring, however, were more divided. One cir-
cuit held that monitoring public movement is not a search; 8 two others
held that automobile monitoring is a search but disagreed over what stan-
dard governed the conduct.3 The Supreme Court turned to this issue in
its first opinion on electronic tracking devices.40
(10th Cir. 1978) (acknowledging resident monitoring is a search, but reaching a different
conclusion for a commercial building). The court in Clayborne compared the commercial
building to the garage in United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1002 (1976). Whether this distinction will work in light of Karo is uncertain. The
"withdrawn from public view" language is ambiguous. The majority did, however, hold that
respondents had a reasonable expectation of privacy in a locker of a storage facility; thus,
had the beeper disclosed the presence of the can in that particular locker, the warrantless
monitoring would have violated the fourth amendment at that point. Karo, 104 S. Ct. at
3306 n.6. In the context of warrantless beeper monitoring, then, the majority clearly does
not limit an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy to his private residence.
The "withdrawn from public view" language appears to be a more expansive reading of
fourth amendment protections in this context than the majority intended. Indeed, as Justice
Stevens pointed out in his dissent, a person driving on public roads with a can in the trunk
of the car is not exposing to the world that he has a can in the trunk. The can is in fact
"withdrawn from public view" and, according to the dissent, deserving of constitutional pro-
tections. Id. at 3313 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This reading of Karo would, however, directly
contradict Knotts, see infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text, where the Court that such
activity did not constitute a search.
36 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1982) (level of legitimate
governmental surveillance "does not constitute a sufficient foundation on which to erect
a[n] . . . expectation of privacy for Fourth Amendment purposes"); see also United States
v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1197 (8th Cir.) ("the location of all airborne planes. . . [must]
be carefully monitored" to prevent collision), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979).
38 See United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211-12 (9th Cir. 1978).
39 See United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (considering to-
gether installation and monitoring and requiring reasonable suspicion for both), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112-13 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978) (auto monitoring is a search requiring probable cause); see also
supra note 32 (discussing different standards to be applied, assuming beeper monitoring is a
search). Knotts clearly disposes of cases involving the warrantless monitoring of beepers
that reveal no information that could not have been obtained through visual surveillance.
See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text.
40 One final electronic tracking issue is the contraband exception. Whether for beeper
installation or monitoring, the previous analyses are preempted when the beeper is attached
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1. The Facts
The factual background of Knotts illustrates many of the reported
cases involving beeper use. Local narcotics agents in Minnesota began in-
vestigating Tristan Armstrong after a chemical company reported that he
was stealing chemicals that could be used to manufacture illicit drugs.41
Visual surveillance revealed Armstrong and David Petchen moving labo-
ratory equipment from a building into a truck. Inside the vacated prem-
ises, agents found more equipment and a white powdery byproduct of
amphetamine synthesis. The agents then discovered that Armstrong had
placed numerous orders for chemicals with another chemical company
and was to pick up a drum of chloroform on a particular date. With the
permission of the chemical company, the agents provided a drum contain-
ing a hidden beeper to use in filling Armstrong's order.
Law enforcement officers followed Armstrong after he picked up the
chloroform. Armstrong drove his car to Petchen's residence where the
drum was placed into another vehicle. The agents followed this car until
losing visual and beeper contact near the Wisconsin border. Using the
tracking device, the agents relocated the vehicle across the border in Wis-
consin. Some time after the officers reestablished visual contact, Petschen
began driving evasively. The agents then terminated surveillance and
eventually lost beeper contact as well. One hour later, the agents located
the beeper near a remote cabin, and they maintained intermittent visual
surveillance until the following day when Petschen left with Leroy
Knotts.
Three days later, government agents obtained a warrant authorizing a
search of the cabin and surrounding property. The agents found a fully
operable drug laboratory in the cabin and the beeper-laden drum just
outside. At the trial of Knotts and Petchen, the district court overruled a
motion to suppress evidence from the cabin. Defendants claimed that
warrantless beeper monitoring violated their fourth amendment rights.
to a known item of contraband. This usually occurs when police have lawfully intercepted
controlled substances or illicit drugs in the mail or through undercover operations. A beeper
is placed in the package containing the contraband to facilitate a controlled delivery. The
courts hold that neither installation nor monitoring is a search, typically reasoning that
there is "'no legitimate expectation of privacy in substances which [citizens] have no right
to possess at all.'" United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) (quoting
United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 111 (1st Cir. 1977)); see also United States v. Botero,
589 F.2d 430, 432 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147, 1154 (7th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v.
French, 414 F. Supp. 800, 803-04 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Houlihan v. State, 551 S.W.2d 719, 722
(Crim. App. Tex. 1977).
41 The following discussion is excerpted from the facts presented in United States v.
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 278-79 (1983).
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Reasoning that "[t]he ultimate destination of the can was readily deter-
minable through visual surveillance" of defendants, the district court
found neither a subjective nor a reasonable expectation of privacy in this
setting.42 Knotts and Petschen were convicted of conspiracy to manufac-
ture controlled substances. 43 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit reversed as to Knotts, 44 holding that the monitoring of a
beeper placed in an item of noncontraband personalty that is carried onto
private property constitutes a fourth amendment search.
45
2. The Knotts Holding
The Supreme Court, per Justice Rehnquist, reversed the Eighth Circuit
without dissent and affirmed Knott's conviction.4 The Court held that
2 Brief for Respondent at 2, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
43 460 U.S. at 279.
" 662 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1981).
41 Id. at 517-18. The Eighth Circuit panel focused exclusively on the narrow issue
presented-that is, whether the monitoring of a beeper placed in an item of noncontraband
personalty and carried onto private property is a search under the fourth amendment. The
panel emphasized that "[tihis is not a case of a beeper being attached to an automobile, so
the ultimate issue is not whether there can be an expectation of privacy in the route taken
by an auto over public roads." Id. at 517. Three times the court characterized the barrel as
being "out of public view," as it was found "beneath a wooden barrel in the yard of a remote
rustic cabin." Id. at 518. The court concluded that Knotts, a resident of the cabin, "could
certainly have a reasonable, legitimate expectation of privacy in the kind and location of
objects out of public view on his land." Id. Thus the court viewed the issue as one of private
monitoring and decided it much the same way as United States v. Karo. See supra notes 29-
35 and accompanying text (monitoring of items "withdrawn from public view" is a search).
46 460 U.S. at 285. The Supreme Court affirmed Knotts' conviction because it framed
(not necessarily reasoned) the issue differently than did the Eighth Circuit. The lower court
emphasized that the drum was "out of public view," whereas Justice Rehnquist twice char-
acterized the drum as being in the "open fields." Id. at 282. See United States v. Hester, 265
U.S. 57 (1924) (observation of private property not a search when it occurs in the open
fields). The Court repeatedly argued that "there is no indication that the beeper was used in
any way to reveal information. . . that would not have been visible to the naked eye from
outside the cabin," id. at 285, and that "Itihere is nothing in [the] record indicat[ing] that
the beeper signal was received or relied upon after it had indicated that the drum. . . had
ended its automotive journey at rest on respondent's premises." Id. at 284-85. Thus, con-
trary to the Eighth Circuit's understanding, the "ultimate issue" in Knotts was whether
there is a reasonable expectation of privacy in the route taken by an auto over public roads.
Justice Stevens concurred and argued that the record did not support the majority's im-
plication that the drum was "parading in 'open fields' . . . in a manner tantamount to its
public display on the highways." Id. at 288. Justice Blackmun similarly contended that the
Court should have refrained from discussing the "open fields" doctrine, because cases that
present the issue more directly had already been admitted to the Court's docket. Id. at 287.
Neither Stevens nor Blackmun, however, stated how he would explain the decision without
reference to "open fields." Presumably they thought that the beeper transmitted all the
data necessary for conviction-the location at which the drugs were manufactured-before
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the monitoring of a beeper that merely reveals the movement of an auto-
mobile traveling along public roads is not a search or seizure under the
fourth amendment.41 Knotts left open the issues of beeper installation
and resident monitoring decided subsequently in United States v. Karo.48
After distinguishing the fact situation presented from one in which the
beeper monitored property within a private dwelling, the Court offered
three arguments for the conclusion that vehicular monitoring is not a
search.
First, the Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in automo-
bile travel, because an automobile's movements are exposed to public ob-
servation.49 Second, the Court analogized the beeper to other technologi-
cal means of surveillance, specifically the searchlight and pen register.
According to recent Supreme Court opinions, police are constitutionally
permitted to use these devices to improve law enforcement efficiency.50
Finally, Justice Rehnquist suggested that beeper monitoring reveals no
more information than does visual tailing, a practice clearly permissible
under the Constitution. 5'
Although the Court's holding explicitly permits the warrantless moni-
toring of automobile travel only, its reasoning extends to the surveillance
of any public movement.52 An individual arguably has a greater privacy
the beeper reached private property.
'7 460 U.S. at 285.
48 See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. The respondent in Knotts did not chal-
lenge the constitutionality of the installation of the beeper, consequently, the Court did not
pass on this issue. 460 U.S. at 279. In the first of three concurrences, however, Justice Bren-
nan suggested that the case "would have been ... much more difficult" had the respondent
raised the installation issue. Id. at 286. Brennan noted that a governmental trespass is still
significant in determining whether a search has occurred. Such intrusions may be searches
"even if the same information could have been obtained by other means." Id.
The Court also failed to resolve the "contraband exception" to the fourth amendment in
this context.
11 The Court supported this proposition with citations to several cases involving the auto-
mobile exception to the warrant requirement. 460 U.S. at 281. Justice Rehnquist reasoned
from the diminished expectation of privacy assumption underlying the automobile exception
to a complete absence of reasonable privacy expectations in a car traveling over public
roads. Id.
50 Id. at 282-83. Justice Stevens objected to the Court's broad dicta that the fourth
amendment does not prohibit "the police from augmenting [their] sensory faculties"; he
concluded that such statements conflict with previous readings of the fourth amendment
and incorrectly imply that police use of new surveillance technology "does not implicate
especially sensitive concerns." Id.
" Id. at 284-85.
"' The Court appeared to say as much in United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984)
where it stated one of the questions presented: "[w]e are called upon to address [a] ques-
tion[] left unresolved in Knotts: ... whether monitoring of a beeper falls within the ambit
of the Fourth Amendment when it reveals information that could not have been obtained
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expectation in an automobile than in any other mode of transportation.
In fact, the Supreme Court noted recently that because of the extensive
time spent traveling in cars, individuals probably feel more secure in their
automobiles than on a public sidewalk.53 One exposes more when on foot
or riding a bus than when driving a car, and so a police officer can follow
an individual walking or riding a bus at least as easily as he can follow
someone riding in a car. The Knotts argument therefore applies a fortiori
to warrantless monitoring of pedestrians or of passengers on a common
carrier. In short, it is safe to assert that Knotts permits warrantless elec-
tronic tracking of all public movement.
5 4
The following section analyzes each of the three arguments expounded
in Knotts to support the Court's conclusion that monitoring public move-
ment is not a search.
II. AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF United States v. Knotts
In establishing that the monitoring of beeper signals that reveal the
location of a vehicle traveling over public roads is not a fourth amend-
ment search, the Court in Knotts offered three arguments. First, the
Court found no reasonable expectation of privacy in public automobile
movement. Second, it analogized the beeper to other permissible elec-
tronic investigative tools. Third, the Court held that beepers merely re-
present an efficient substitute for visual surveillance. This section ana-
lyzes each of these arguments under a traditional view of the fourth
amendment as the source and guardian of individual constitutional rights.
It concludes that despite problems with the Court's first two rationales,
through visual surveillance." Id. at 3299. A reasonable inference is that the Court views
Knotts as having decided that beeper monitoring is not a search when the information could
be obtained through visual surveillance. Visual surveillance could in theory reveal all public
movement.
53 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979). The Court's decision in Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968), emphasizes this point. In Terry, the Court held that a policeman may
"stop and frisk" a person on reasonable suspicion that the person poses a risk of danger or
has engaged in a crime. Id. at 27, 30. Despite this holding, the fourth amendment still re-
quires probable cause to search the interior of an automobile. See United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 806-09 (1982); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925).
4 This proposition is not trivial; the technology has long existed to conceal beepers in
clothing, eyeglasses, wristwatches, and other personal items. See A. Westin, Privacy and
Freedom 69-70 (1967) (asserting that a "'radio pill'. . . tag can be lodged in the stomach of
the subject himself"). See also United States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass.
1976) ("There is nothing in the nature of these beepers which limits their use to
automobiles and large packages. Presumably, no technological problem prevents agents
from placing such devices on, for example, a person's clothing."), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
vacated in part sub nom. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 926 (1978).
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Knotts is compelling under the traditional individual rights approach in
its characterization of beeper monitoring as a substitute for visual
surveillance.
A. Privacy Expectations in Automobile Travel
At the outset, the Court established that, for conduct to constitute a
search, the challenged governmental action must intrude upon an expec-
tation of privacy that is "reasonable." 5 Relying on the well established
principle that individuals enjoy only a "diminished expectation of privacy
surrounding the automobile,""6 the Court concluded that the public na-
ture of automobile travel negates the existence of any reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy. According to the opinion, there is clearly a lessened pri-
vacy expectation in items so exposed to the general public and to
occasional government inspection.5" Furthermore, the Knotts Court rea-
soned, because automobile travel along public roads is exposed to by-
standers, an individual cannot reasonably expect such information to re-
main secret.58
This analysis resembles that applied in United States v. White,5 in
which the Court upheld warrantless electronic eavesdropping where one
of the participants in the conversation consented to its recording. The
Court in White reasoned that because the consenting participant could
later recount the conversation, there was no privacy invasion when agents
'5 The Court began its discussion by tracing the evolution of the meaning of "search or
seizure." Knotts, 460 U.S. at 280. The modern test of whether there has been a search re-
quires that a legitimate expectation of privacy exist subjectively and that the expectation be
"one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281 (quoting
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). See supra note 8.
56 Id. at 281.
57 460 U.S. at 281 (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion)
(while a car travels on public thoroughfares, "both its occupants and its contents are in
plain view")). The Court also cited South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976),
where it had stated that the expectation of privacy in a car is much less than that in a
home, because the former is subjected to pervasive and continuing governmental regulation
and control. 460 U.S. at 281.
"8 The Court concluded that, given the frequent contact an automobile and its driver
have with the public:
A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another. When Petschen
traveled over the public streets he voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to
look the fact that he was traveling over particular roads in a particular direction, the
fact of whatever stops he made, and the fact of his final destination when he exited
from public roads onto private property.
460 U.S. at 281-82.
59 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Compare United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296, 3304 n.4 with id.
at 3307-10 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (different readings of White in the beeper context).
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recorded it.6 0 Several courts have applied the White rationale to elec-
tronic tracking cases, holding that because "[t]he defendant's automobile
movements were at all times in full view of the public,. . . the public as
well as Government agents could have revealed what they saw. ' 61
Courts applying the White analysis to electronic vehicle tracking ignore
the nature of the privacy interest involved in automobile travel. An indi-
vidual clearly understands that others may see him driving down a road.
His privacy interest, however, generally rests on keeping secret the sum
and not the parts of his trip. The sum consists of four or five elements:
the starting point, the intermediate and/or final destinations, the roads
traveled, the identity of the driver and/or passengers, and possibly the
contents of the vehicle.2 The public may observe and determine any of
these elements, thereby eliminating any reasonable privacy expectation in
them individually. People may observe a driver traveling over particular
roads in a particular direction; others may see the driver stop at an un-
known residence. Yet because the combination of these elements will be
unknown to any single person in almost every case, the driver's privacy
remains secure . 3
Distinctions between the facts of White and those of beeper cases fur-
ther militate against application of this analysis to electronic monitoring
of automobiles. White involved an informant who consented to the police
taping his conversations with a suspect. Public vehicular movements,
though, involve no willing participant and only a slight possibility that
any individual knows all elements of the driver's trip. Moreover, in White
the government was able to identify the specific participant in the con-
versation who consented to the taping. Knotts merely assumes a person's
consent to identifying the driver's route, if such an observer even exists.
If the public actually could reveal the driver's route, it is curious that law
enforcement agents do not more often rely on "the public" for such infor-
10 401 U.S. at 751-52.
" United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1002 (1976);
see also United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 940 n.4 (6th Cir. 1980) (no legitimate expecta-
tion of privacy in information that a goverment agent could lawfully have acquired under
conditions more favorable to sensory reception); United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258,
1264 (5th Cir.) (no legal right to protect mistaken belief that person in whom one confides
will keep one's secrets), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979).
62 See, e.g., A. Westin, supra note 54, at 165; Holder, Privacy Lost, Student Law., Dec.
1983, at 14, 17.
63 See Yale Note, supra note 4, at 1494 ("An individual may thus be entitled to rely on
the privacy of his 'route,' even if segments of it are exposed."); see also LaFave, Nine Key
Decisions Expand Authority to Search and Seize, 69 A.B.A. J. 1740, 1740 (1983) ("Only an
army of bystanders, conveniently strung out on the route and who not only 'wanted to look'
but also wanted to pass on what he observed to the next in line" would truly invade the
driver's privacy interest and expectation.).
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mation. In short, the need for visual and beeper surveillance belies the
claim that identifiable members of the public know and will provide in-
formation about a suspect's travels.
With this understanding of route privacy, it becomes evident that the
precedent relied on in Knotts does not support a diminished expectation
of privacy in vehicular movement. The cases cited in Knotts involve the
physical contents or characteristics of an automobile.4 Because a car is
driven in public, parked in public, and subject to regulatory inspections,
people may observe through its windows what rests in "plain view" on the
seats, floorboards, or dashboards. Hence, individuals usually do not leave
or carry personal items in their car. These generalizations, however,
merely establish a diminished privacy expectation in the contents or ap-
pearance of automobiles, not in the history of their travel.
Although the public nature of automobile travel reduces one's privacy
expectations in the vehicle, some privacy interest remains. In fact, the
Supreme Court has rejected the notion that cars are without fourth
amendment protection.6 5 It reasons that, because individuals spend so
much time in their automobiles, some protection is essential.16 This pri-
vacy expectation is reflected in the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement. The exception acknowledges a diminished expectation of
privacy surrounding a car, but not the absence of any privacy interest.
Indeed, although police need not obtain a warrant to search an automo-
bile, the Court consistently holds that the fourth amendment requires a
showing of probable cause that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime67
Thus, the Knotts conclusion that beeper monitoring of vehicular move-
ment invades no reasonable privacy interest contradicts other Supreme
Court decisions addressing the privacy expectation surrounding
automobiles."'
64 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
61 See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) ("[a]n individual operating or travel-
ing in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the
automobile and its use are subject to governmental regulation").
66 Id.
67 See S. Saltzburg, supra note 26, at 234-35 (collecting cases).
"I See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662-63 (1979) ("Were the individual subject
to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed"); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971) ("The word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose
presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears"); see also United States v.
Moore, 562 F.2d 106, ]12 (1st Cir. 1977) (although the public nature of automobile travel
reduces considerably the intrusion occasioned by beeper monitoring, the intrusion cannot be
characterized as nonexistent), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
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B. Similarity to Other Surveillance Technologies
The Knotts Court also supported its conclusion by analogizing beepers
to other technological surveillance devices. Specifically, the Court quoted
language from Supreme Court cases holding that use of searchlights and
pen registers is not a search. In United States v. Lee,69 for example, the
Court upheld the use of a searchlight at night to scan a ship's deck for
illegal liquor." Similarly, the Court noted its recent conclusion in Smith
v. Maryland7i that the use of pen registers by law enforcement officials to
record the numbers dialed for local telephone calls is not a search.72
These analogies, however, are useful only as examples of the legitimate
expectation of privacy test, not as alternatives to it. Unfortunately, the
Court failed to explain the similarities between a beeper and a search-
light, flashlight, or pen register for purposes of fourth amendment
analysis.
In analyzing the uses of these technological devices, the focus remains
on the reasonableness of the privacy expectation vis-A-vis the public. Peo-
ple use artificial light when it is dark, so an expectation that one roaming
in public at night will not be exposed to light arguably is unreasonable.
Furthermore, the degree and duration of scrutiny necessary to reveal the
information represents a more critical distinction between searchlights
69 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
70 Id. at 563. It should be noted that the Court decided Lee under the old trespass dis-
tinction of United States v. Olmstead, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), that the Court abandoned in
United States v. Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), in favor of a legitimate expectation of privacy
test. See supra note 2. Nonetheless, the Katz Court cited Lee for the proposition that
"[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protections." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. One month after Knotts, the Court again cited
Lee in holding that a police officer's use of a flashlight to illuminate an automobile interior
is not a search under the fourth amendment. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740 (1983). The
Court has thus expressly brought the Lee holding within modern privacy expectations
doctrine.
7-1 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
71 Id. at 735. A pen register is an instrument that records the numbers dialed on a tele-
phone. In an investigation, a pen register is usually installed at a central telephone facility
rather than near the building containing the telephones. See United States v. New York Tel.
Co., 434 U.S. 159, 161-62, 161 n.1 (1977). Because a telephone caller exposes the numbers he
dials to the telephone company "in the ordinary course of business," the caller assumes the
risk that the phone company will reveal the information to the police and therefore retains
no legitimate privacy expectation. Id. at 744. The lower courts have reached similar conclu-
sions by analogizing beepers to other surveillance technologies. See, e.g., United States v.
Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 258 nn. 14 & 16 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (pen register and binoculars),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v. Dubrofsky, 581 F.2d 208, 211 (9th Cir.
1978) (binoculars, tracking and sniffing dogs, searchlights, flourescent powders, radar de-
vices, bait money); United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 32 (9th Cir. 1976) (binoculars,
tracking dogs, searchlights).
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and beepers. A single flash may penetrate the secrecy of the dark,
whereas beepers require continued observation to discover someone's
identity, route, and final destination. Similarly, the use of pen register
records differs from beeper monitoring and is analogous to the partici-
pant recording permitted in United States v. White."3 The government
can point to a particular third party, the telephone company, and can
receive consent of that party to examine the records. In sum, the permis-
sibility of these "analogous" technologies that the Court discusses merely
establishes that the police may collect information that is actually and
frequently, not hypothetically or rarely, revealed to nongovernmental
agents.
Not only do people and private corporations frequently use artificial
illumination and pen registers, but the information these devices reveal
usually has been exposed for some time. And although the use of pen
registers is a more recent phenomenon, the Court partially grounded its
decision in Smith on the fact that this conduct did not offend historical
expectations of privacy.7 4 In contrast, the electronic beeper represents a
new technological development never encountered by most individuals.
Hence, its use is not a part of the "understandings that are recognized
and permitted by society" that determine legitimate expectations of pri-
vacy. The Knotts Court's technological analogies thus offer little support
for its finding of no fourth amendment protection.
C. Making Visual Surveillance More Efficient
The final argument in Knotts is more persuasive. Individuals under-
stand that police sometimes engage in extended visual surveillance. Our
society has accepted the ancient surveillance technique of physical
shadowing since the founding of our government.76 The case law estab-
lishes that even an extended police tail is not a search, with exceptions
for intentionally obtrusive and harassing surveillance.7 7 Even if such war-
rantless surveillance seems difficult to square with the fourth amend-
ment, as some have argued,78 courts consistently reaffirm its validity.7 9
73 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
74 Smith, 442 U.S. at 744-45 (early phone systems required operator assistance, conse-
quently reducing privacy expectations in person called).
76 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
76 See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 118 ("From the earliest days of the American republic,
law and public opinion have accepted such clandestine police techniques as shadowing
7; See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 513 F.2d 928 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. McCall, 243 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1957).
78 See Yale Note, supra note 4, at 1494.
79 See, e.g., United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1976) ("The intrusion
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The Court's decision not to regulate visual surveillance might be de-
fended as a realistic recognition of the limited threat this police activity
represents. The expense of placing a police tail on a suspect probably re-
stricts its use to cases of reasonable and individualized suspicion.80 The
Court in Knotts argued that, given the permissibility of warrantless visual
surveillance, beeper monitoring of automobile travel merely represents a
more reliable means of tailing suspects.8 According to the Court, a police
car following a defendant throughout his journey could have observed his
entire route. Hence, beeper monitoring simply enhances the effectiveness
of constitutionally permissible visual tailing that is unquestionably
permissible.
In making this point, however, the Court adopted broad and trouble-
some language: "We have never equated police efficiency with unconstitu-
tionality, and we decline to do so now. . . . Nothing in the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties
bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and tech-
nology afforded them in this case.""2 "Efficiency" and "sense enhance-
ment" are ambiguous terms that ignore privacy expectations. The fourth
amendment ranks privacy interests above unbridled law enforcement effi-
ciency; indeed, efficiency concerns often have fallen to the superior con-
cerns of privacy. One could argue, as did Justice Stevens in his concur-
rence, that the Court prohibited the efficiency of certain aural sense
enhancements in United States v. Katz, s 3 where it held unconstitutional
the warrantless electronic eavesdropping of a telephone conversation.8 4
Furthermore, courts have generally required a warrant for the use of "ef-
ficient" devices such as x-rays and magnetometers.5
That technological advances will steadily reduce individuals' privacy
on defendant's privacy was no greater here than an intrusion created by manual, visual
surveillance of the car's location, which is clearly permissible irrespective of fourth amend-
ment considerations.") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977).
80 The possibility that economic restraints may adequately replace judicial control of tail-
ing is explored infra notes 125-33 and accompanying text. There it is argued that resource
restraints sufficiently control visual tailing but fail to check technological surveillance such
as beepers. Note, however, that focusing on an individual case does not permit consideration
of systemic restraints on police. The variable of resource scarcity is relevant only in a social
or collective context. See infra Part III.
81 460 U.S. at 285 ("scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues
which visual surveillance would not also raise").
82 460 U.S. at 282-84.
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 288 (Stevens, J., concurring).
8' See, e.g., United States v. Haynie, 637 F.2d 227, 230 (4th Cir.) (use of x-ray scanner is a
search), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1980); United States v. Albarado, 495 F.2d 799, 803 (2d
Cir. 1974) (use of magnetometer is a search).
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expectations over time represents a more subtle threat to fourth amend-
ment protections."' A new technology, once accepted, may lower privacy
expectations enough to justify a slightly more intrusive generation of
technological surveillance. s 7 The Court should guard against the danger of
technological evolution by preserving as a minimum the privacy expecta-
tions of the past.88 But Justice Rehnquist's broad dictum in Knotts over-
looks this threat. In addition to the broad endorsements of police effi-
ciency and sense enhancement, the Court adopts a "wait and see" posture
regarding possible abuses of beeper technology. Respondent argued that
the police might use beepers to engage in continuous and unsupervised
surveillance of any individual. The Court responded that "if such dragnet
type law enforcement practices. . . should eventually occur, there will be
time enough then to determine whether different constitutional principles
may be applicable."8 This approach ignores the fact that once such prac-
tices become routine, they may not be perceived as violating expectations
of privacy.
The broad "efficiency" language of Khotts may be read to support a
narrower, more convincing point. Devices such as x-ray machines and
magnetometers collect information previously obtainable only by a search
regulated by the fourth amendment. Likewise, electronic eavesdropping
equipment replaces the need for police to enter a private place and over-
hear a conversation, an act that requires a warrant. Beeper monitoring,
on the other hand, merely provides information that police can obtain
without a search-that is, through visual surveillance. In short, the
beeper represents a substitute for an age-old police technique that falls
beyond the scope of the fourth amendment.9 0
s6 After Katz, Justice Harlan observed that "[o]ur expectations, and the risks we assume,
are in large part reflections of laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the
past and present." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
87 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886) ("illegitimate and unconstitutional
practices get their first footing ... by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal
modes of procedure").
I' To prevent such encroachment, one commentator has suggested that "the Court...
adopt a principle of conservation which would focus judicial attention on a historical, pre-
electronic, measure of privacy and provide a standard for conserving the level of privacy
which has vitalized our society in the past." Comment, Electronic Eavesdropping and the
Right to Privacy, 52 B.U.L. Rev. 831, 839 (1972); see also United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d
515, 517 (8th Cir. 1981) (viewing the beeper issue as part of the larger "philosophical ques-
tion" of "whether the constitutional protections of privacy must or should diminish with
technological innovations in surveillance"), rev'd, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
89 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983).
90 Id. at 285; see also Hufford, 539 F.2d at 34 ("[T]he [beeper] device only augments that
which can be done by visual surveillance alone; with more agents and more automobiles or




Read narrowly, the Court's efficiency argument thus supports its con-
clusion that beeper monitoring equals no more than visual surveillance.
Because there appears to be no authority or willingness to bring the an-
cient tactic of visual surveillance under the fourth amendment, courts
and commentators advocating constitutional control of beeper monitoring
must distinquish the two investigatory techniques.9 1 Attempts to make
this distinction, however, fail because they focus solely on the effect of
surveillance on the individual. The following section argues that the
threat of beeper monitoring to society as a whole differs from the threat
of such conduct to individuals. Despite the Court's conclusion in Knotts,
an analysis of the fourth amendment read to embrace collective privacy
interests reveals that warrantless beeper monitoring poses an unconstitu-
tional threat to society under a modern notion of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches or seizures.
III. A COLLECTIVE PRIVACY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF BEEPER MONITORING
UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
By focusing on an individual subject of beeper surveillance, it seems
obvious that electronic tracking is merely the equivalent of conventional
tailing. But in comparing the aggregate police practices of visual versus
electronic surveillance, it is not clear that the societal effects are the
same. The efficiency of beeper monitoring may facilitate a higher fre-
quency of surveillance, and its technological nature may generate greater
societal anxiety. Regardless of how this empirical question is answered,
the collective effects of a police practice should be considered in fourth
amendment cases like Knotts.
A. Collective Fourth Amendment Rights
The effect of the governmental action on the individual's privacy ex-
pectation determines whether he has been searched or seized unreasona-
bly. But courts should not focus solely on the invasion of an individual's
91 One commentator has accepted the individual rights analysis and in arguing against
unrestricted beeper monitoring likewise has condemned visual surveillance. See Yale Note,
supra note 4, at 1494-95 & 1494 n.145 (arguing that what one knowingly exposes to the
public is only what "reasonably curious persons" might observe and that beeper monitoring
is a search because no such person is likely to engage in it; concluding that continuous
visual surveillance is a search). But see W. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.7, at 434 (noting that
"no court decision has been found adopting this position or even intimating that it might be
adopted.") Thus, it appears necessary to distinguish beeper monitoring from visual surveil-
lance to provide an effective argument for applying fourth amendment protections to the




privacy. The collective effects of a police practice include two compo-
nents. First, courts must determine the aggregate losses individuals have
suffered from police surveillance. Second, to recognize fully the collective
interest, courts must measure all the negative effects society suffers from
police activity that interferes with individual privacy. The ripple effect of
an individual's confrontation with law enforcement officials increases the
threat to society as a whole.92 The knowledge of government surveillance
creates an anxiety in individuals not under investigation that the state
may treat them similarly. This collective anxiety is clear in instances of
patently illegal searches or seizures. 93
Thus, when courts consider this interest in adjudicating fourth amend-
ment rights, they should focus on both the aggregate of individual police
encounters and the synergistic effects of pervasive police practice on soci-
ety as a whole. This section contends that the fourth amendment does
protect collective privacy rights and concludes that Knotts undermines
societal privacy interests. The language of the fourth amendment as well
as the privacy values it embodies dictate this approach.
A close reading of the fourth amendment supports the notion that peo-
ple as a group have a right to be confident that the government will not
make unreasonable intrusions into their "persons, houses, papers and ef-
fects." The text of the fourth amendment guarantees a "right of the peo-
ple," whereas the fifth and sixth amendments speak only of a "person" or
"the accused."94 Moreover, the amendment guarantees the people a right
to be "secure," a word that means "free from fear, care, or anxiety: easy
in mind. . . having no doubt."95 Manifestly concerned with the repose of
the people, the framers of the fourth amendment did not merely create a
right of individuals to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures, but
92 The idea of collective fourth amendment interests is hardly new. See Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Among deprivations of
rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and
putting terror in every heart. Search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weap-
ons in the arsenal of every arbitrary government."). The age of this view strengthens its
appeal. This note seeks to provide a clearer understanding of how collective rights should be
protected by the judiciary.
9' For example, when police enter and search a residence at night without a warrant, this
conduct disturbs not only those living in the residence, but also neighbors and others aware
of the search who fear that the same will happen to them.
'4 See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 432-33
(1974) (arguing that the wording of the fourth amendment is not accidental, but reflects a
pattern of collective rights found in the first, second, and ninth amendments).
95 Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language 2053 (unabridged
ed. 1971). The word "free" is a plausible substitute for "secure" in the fourth amendment.
Focusing on the right to be free from unreasonable searches might eliminate concern for




a societal right to be free from the fear such practices create. When the
police ransack a house in the middle of the night, a neighbor is still "free
from" searches but not "secure . . against" them.
Interest balancing under the fourth amendment also supports the col-
lective rights approach. In applying the privacy expectations test, the
Court must balance law enforcement needs against fourth amendment
privacy interests. Under Justice Harlan's formulation, the test requires
not only a subjective privacy expectation, but also one that society recog-
nizes as reasonable. 6 Thus, to determine socially reasonable expectations
the Court inquires whether a defendant's subjective privacy expectation
comports with the subjective expectations of other members of society.97
Because subjective expectations do not exist in a vacuum, the Court's de-
cisions are one important factor influencing the actual expectations of
members of society and, hence, determining socially reasonable behavior.
The Court's determination, as Harlan recognized, represents a norma-
tive evaluation and not a neutral description. Indeed, Harlan warned that
judges "should not . . . merely recite the expectations and risks without
examining the desirability of saddling them upon society."9 8 Motivated
by this concern, the Supreme Court observed in Smith v. Maryland" that
the test of reasonable privacy expectations is inadequate where the gov-
ernment eliminates those expectations essential to a democracy by pub-
licizing a policy of intrusion. The Court echoed Harlan's conclusion that
9 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
97 Courts addressing this issue are then able to avoid deciding what privacy expectations
"ought" to be "reasonable." The judge merely looks to the common expectations of society
and determines whether the defendant's expectation is shared by other members of society.
Of course, there is a problem in deciding how many other members of society must share
the privacy expectation before it becomes reasonable.
Development of a neutral definition of reasonable expectations, however, is a futile and
unnecessary effort. If courts were sincerely interested in defining "reasonable" privacy ex-
pectations neutrally, they would rely upon sophisticated opinion surveys and the like to
determine what expectations are common. But the courts are far more likely to apply their
own notions of what privacy expectations are reasonable and then attribute those expecta-
tions to the bulk of the population. Compare Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979)
("Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe
that telephone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation that
the numbers they dial will remain secret.") with id. at 749 n.1 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("Lacking the Court's apparently exhaustive knowledge of this Nation's telephone books
and the reading habits of telephone subscribers ... I decline to assume general public
awareness of how obscene phone calls are traced."). Justice Marshall apparently thinks that
such "neutral" reasoning merely represents the majority's view of reasonable expectations,
and he suggests that the Court focus rather on "the risks [an individual] should be forced to
assume in a free and open society." Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
,' United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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in such cases a normative inquiry is proper in determining legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy.100 Clearly, whenever the Court decides not to pro-
tect a privacy claim because it is unsupported by actual expectations
among members of society, the Court makes the normative judgment that
the privacy interest is not fundamental and that society can exist without
it.' 01
It is illogical not to include collective interests in making such utilitar-
ian decisions. All the variables of social utility become relevant once the
question is one of social desirability. 0 2 The language and intent of the
fourth amendment suggest that the synergistic effects of individual police
encounters on collective security should be a primary factor in this in-
quiry. The Court must not focus merely on a single individual in a single
encounter with the police, but it must focus also on the effect of the en-
counter on uninvolved individuals. °3 Indeed, police misuse of new tech-
nologies may exacerbate societal fears, n6t because a surveillance tech-
nique significantly disturbs an affected individual, but because society,
subject to these new techniques, feels threatened by police
investigation.'
o0 Id. at 740 n.5. The Court stated that "where an individual's subjective expectations
had been 'conditioned' by influences alien to well recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms,
those subjective expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what
the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was." Id.
101 See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 750 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Responding to the major-
ity's contention that in some circumstances "a normative inquiry would be proper," id. at
741 n.5, Justice Marshall noted, "No meaningful effort is made to explain what those cir-
cumstances might be, or why this case is not among them." Id. at 750. See Josephson, Book
Review, 15 UCLA L. Rev. 1586, 1599 (1968) (reviewing A. Westin, supra note 54) ("[The
Court must] discover and define the residuum of privacy which is so inviolable that no
amount of notice could justify its invasion.")).
102 See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 25 (suggesting that the "constant search in democra-
cies must be for the proper boundary line in each specific situation and for an over-all
equilibrium that serves to strengthen democratic institutions and processes."); see also
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976) ("In delineating the constitu-
tional safeguards applicable in particular contexts, the Court has weighed the public interest
against the Fourth Amendment interest of the individual .... ).
103 See A. Miller, The Assault on Privacy 207 (1971) (with "electronic surveillance, the
climate or atmosphere of suspicion created by an accumulation of invasions of privacy is of
far greater concern than the direct harm caused by the incidents themselves"); see also Jo-
sephson, supra note 101, at 1599 ("Even quite reasonable surveillance practices which
should be permissible in themselves, may in the aggregate form be the basis of a terribly
oppressive society.").
The Court requires a "structured and rational weighing process" within which it might
consider collective privacy interests. A. Westin, supra note 54, at 370. Justice Harlan sug-
gested that the question of what is a search "must, in my view, be answered by assessing the
nature of a particular practice and the likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense of
security balanced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement."
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The fourth amendment thus dictates the use of collective privacy rights
analysis to identify logically relevant interests that determine reasonable
expectations of privacy. If the use of a surveillance device creates an in-
tolerable risk of undermining our free and open society, then the Court is
obliged to impose constitutional restraints on its use. The Knotts charac-
terization of beeper monitoring as a mere substitute for visual surveil-
lance becomes less compelling under this analysis. In fact, empirical fac-
tors regarding the effect of beeper use on society highlight the stark
distinction between visual and electronic surveillance. The next section
will consider Knotts from the perspective of societal interests.
B. The Threat of Beeper Monitoring to Collective Privacy Interests
1. Individual Interests
Collective fourth amendment interests are measured in part by the ef-
fect of aggregated individual privacy losses on society's feeling of security.
Beeper monitoring of automobile travel, and of public movements gener-
ally, may threaten the individual's informational privacy, undermine his
efforts at anonymity and solitude, and chill his constitutional right to
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J. dissenting). Similarly, recogniz-
ing this collective threat to society, Professor Amsterdam has suggested that the fourth
amendment be considered not a refuge of atomistic individual rights but a "regulatory ca-
non requiring government to order its law enforcement procedures in a fashion that keeps
us collectively secure in our persons, houses, papers, and effects." Amsterdam, supra note
94, at 367. Another commentator has argued that this conclusion is implicit in the Court's
exclusionary rule opinions. See Doernberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling Collec-
tive and Individual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 287
(1983) ("The Court's repeated insistence that the exclusionary rule is not personal to the
accused but is a judicially created remedy designed to vindicate a societal interest is thus an
affirmation of the existence of a juridically cognizable societal interest.") Doernberg con-
cludes that "the Court should explicitly recognize the societal interest for what it is-a col-
lective constitutional right." Id. at 294.
Although this note embraces Doernberg's conclusion, it criticizes his reasoning. He argues
that the exclusionary rule proves that there are collective fourth amendment rights. But the
means of enforcing rights do not necessarily reveal the nature of the rights enforced. It
would be perfectly consistent to recognize only individual rights under the fourth amend-
ment, and then to protect those rights with the exclusionary rule. An individual's right
under the amendment is to be free from unreasonable searches; the collective right is to be
confident that one will not be unreasonably searched. Clearly, the exclusionary rule could be
used solely to vindicate an individual constitutional right. Indeed, the exclusionary rule cov-
ers violations of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the sixth
amendment right to counsel, as well as the fourth amendment guarantees. Hence, in decid-
ing the parameters of the exclusionary rule, courts could weigh only the detriment to indi-
viduals actually affected by police encounters, and not the effect on the collective fear of
surrounding individuals not searched. Doernberg's reasoning would make almost every right
"collective" because society often protects individual rights by collective laws or policies.
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travel. This section discusses these individual interests and then argues
that, although visual surveillance affects these interests, electronic track-
ing may compound individual losses to create a far greater collective
danger.
a. Informational Privacy
Although the Supreme Court in Knotts refused to recognize a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in public movements, individuals are entitled
to have secrets, and constant surveillance of their movements might re-
veal those secrets to watchers. The problem drinker who goes to an Al-
coholics Anonymous meeting, the patient who drives to his psychiatrist's
office, the homosexual who visits a gay bar, the spouse who has a rendez-
vous with another lover, the teenager or adult who skips school or work to
go fishing, would all be exposed if someone constantly tracked their pub-
lic movements. 10 5 For the most part, however, individuals in these situa-
tions retain their secrets and hence their informational privacy despite
exposing their movements.
Associational freedom, a distinguishing characteristic of any free soci-
ety, similarly involves privacy interests. The first amendment, for exam-
ple, protects the privacy of associational membership,' and the Court
has interpreted it to guarantee the right of political associations to refuse
to disclose membership lists. 0 7 Although the Court has indicated that the
identity cloak does not provide an absolute immunity from governmental
investigation,'08 constant surveillance of a person's movements could, over
time, reveal associational tendencies as thoroughly as a membership list.
One jurist, emphasizing the importance in a free society of protecting
information about one's travels from technological intrusions, has con-
cluded that "privacy of movement itself is deserving of Fourth Amend-
ment protections."0 9 Such a privacy interest promotes democratic values
by facilitating informational secrecy and by protecting associational free-
105 It is arguable that these acts deserve no privacy protection because they are transgres-
sions. But privacy rights must function to shield individuals from constant reprisal for vio-
lating ambivalent social norms. See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 35 (observing that "[i]f
there were no privacy to permit society to ignore these deviations-if all transgressions were
known-most persons in society would be under organizational discipline or in jail, or could
be manipulated by threats of such action").
106 See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
107 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
108 Id. at 463.
109 United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938, 948 (6th Cir. 1980) (Keith, J., concurring) ("our
idea of freedom is offended and necessarily shrinks at the continual monitoring of personal
movement").
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doms. 11 Whether or not it has a specific constitutional basis, informa-
tional privacy must be considered in evaluating the police practice of
beeper monitoring.
b. Freedom from Attention
In addition to an interest in the concealment of information, the notion
of privacy also includes freedom from attention"' or "control over who
can sense us."11 2 This uncontroversial proposition challenges the Court's
assumption that privacy involves only informational secrecy." 3 This pri-
vacy interest in freedom from attention may be protected by the solitude
of being physically alone, or by the anonymity of blending into a large
number of indifferent people. First, because people seek anonymity in
public, the ability to move about without detection represents a major
component of privacy." 4 In these situations, the individual "does not ex-
pect to be personally identified and held to the full rules of behavior and
role that would operate if he were known to those observing him. In this
state the individual is able to merge into the 'situational landscape.' ""15
Second, people's tendencies to seek solitude in the outdoors supports
the contention that seclusion is essential for self-reflective and religious
contemplation. Thus, when an individual searches for his "guardian
spirit," he often seeks privacy in the forest or on the beach." 6 Further-
more, children, adolescents, and indigents rely on the outdoors for pri-
vacy they lack when under supervision or in a crowded residence."' In
striking down a vagrancy statute as unconstitutionally vague, Justice
110 Indeed, one feature distinguishing a totalitarian regime from an open society is the
totalitarian regime's refusal to overlook minor transgressions and its prohibition of private
associations. See, e.g., United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 272 (5th Cir.) (en banc)
(Godbold, C.J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); see also Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Free movement by the citizen
is of course as dangerous to a tyrant as free expression of ideas or the right of assembly and
it is therefore controlled in most countries in the interests of security.").
" See Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 432-33, 447 (1980).
112 Parker, A Definition of Privacy, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 275, 280-81 (1974).
113 Id. at 280. Parker gives the example of the woman who suffers a loss of privacy when a
former lover peers through the window at her undressed. Even if no new information is
revealed, the woman nonetheless loses "control over who, at the moment, can see her body."
Id.
1" See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 69.
115 Id. at 31.
Id. at 19.
17 See Laufer & Wolfe, Privacy as a Concept and a Social Issue: A Multidimensional
Development Theory, J. Soc. Issues, No. 3, at 22, 30 (1977) (reporting based on study "that
suburban/rural children and adolescents frequently named the outdoors as a private place,
and it was more often mentioned by respondents who shared a bedroom and lived in a
household with more than seven occupants").
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Douglas emphasized the importance of free public movement to the polit-
ical liberty Americans have historically enjoyed:
[T]hese activities [wandering or strolling] are historically part of
the amenities of life as we have known them. . . .These unwritten
amenities have been in part responsible for giving our people the
feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativ-
ity. These amenitites have dignified the right of dissent and have
honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy sub-
missiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits rather than
hushed, suffocating silence.""
Electronic surveillance of any kind focuses attention on people, conse-
quently interfering with the feeling of independence, confidence, and
freedom that "wandering and strolling" otherwise provides." 9
c. The Constitutional Right to Travel
The most established constitutional right relevant to a collective pri-
vacy analysis of beeper use is the right to travel. Based on the need for an
integrated national economy, this right originally applied only to inter-
state travel. In Shapiro v. Thompson,"20 however, the Court focused on
constitutional concepts of personal liberty and argued that this liberty
"require[s] all citizens [to] be free to travel throughout the length and
breadth of our land uninhibited by statutes, rules, or regulations which
unreasonably burden or restrict this movement."' 2
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed whether this liberty
interest encompasses intrastate travel, the lower courts consistently have
protected the right to travel within a state as equal to the right of inter-
state movement. 12 2 Indeed, the liberty rationale for the right to travel
118 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972). In Papachristou, the
Court declared unconstitutional on vagueness grounds a vagrancy ordinance that outlawed,
among other things, "wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object." Id. at 156 n.1. According to Professor Tribe, Papachristou recognized a
protected right to move about. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 956 n.20 (1978). In
light of the Court's acknowledgement that the freedom to move about free from the atten-
tion of the authorities represents an important source of individual liberty, it is important
to consider the effects of beeper monitoring on the collective exercise of an established lib-
erty interest and an arguably implicit constitutional right.
119 See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 31 ("Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic
observation in public places destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek in
open spaces and public arenas.").
1-20 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
121 Id. at 629.
122 See L. Tribe, supra note 118, at 954.
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clearly applies with equal force to local movement.1 3  Because the right to
travel is "a virtually unconditional personal right, ' 124 the Court must con-
sider the possible chilling effect of extensive beeper use on this constitu-
tional guarantee.
2. The Distinguishing Characteristics of Electronic Tracking
Beeper surveillance inhibits informational privacy, freedom from atten-
tion, and the constitutional right to travel. This section argues that there
are three primary factors determining the collective fear or anxiety gener-
ated by police activity: (1) the intrusiveness of the conduct; (2) the perva-
siveness or frequency of the conduct; and (3) the salience of the police
practice to the public. Traditionally the courts consider only intrusive-
ness; the collective rights approach focuses on the societal effect of a po-
lice practice, including its pervasiveness and salience. This section con-
cludes that under the collective rights analysis, beepers represent a far
greater threat to collective privacy interests than does visual surveillance.
a. The Potential Pervasiveness of Beeper Monitoring
When considering the potentially widespread use of beeper monitoring,
the critical question is the extent to which the police will use a technique
in the absence of constitutional restraints. When police behavior falls
outside the protections of the fourth amendment, the police may act as
unreasonably and as frequently as they desire. 25 Other factors, however,
such as the cost of a technique, may limit the scope of such practices. The
government in Knotts, for example, argued that the expense of physical
shadowing and beeper monitoring prevented their excessive and unjusti-
fied use. 26
123 See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring)
("This freedom of movement is the very essence of our free society, setting us apart....
Once the right to travel is curtailed, all other rights suffer, just as when curfew or home
detention is placed on a person."); see also Boim, The Passport System in the USSR, 2 Rev.
Socialist L. 15, 17 (1976) (explaining the USSR's internal passport system as an exercise of
internal political control).
124 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642-43 (1969) (Stewart, J., concurring).
125 See People v. Mayberry, 31 Cal. 3d 335, 345, 644 P.2d 810, 816, 182 Cal. Rptr. 617, 623
(1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) ("Police actions not amounting to searches or seizures may,
with only limited exceptions, be as unreasonable, arbitrary, or groundless as the officers
please to make them."(footnote omitted)); see also 1 W. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.2 at 269
("To say that a particular type of police practice is not a search is to conclude, in effect,
that such activities 'may be as unreasonable as the police please to make them.' "(citations
omitted)).
126 Brief for the United States at 20 n.10, United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983)
("apply[ing] these techniques randomly or without real suspicion of wrongdoing ... would
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Resource scarcity clearly restrains visual surveillance. A number of po-
licemen, for example, are necessary for effective moving tails.127 Conse-
quently, tailing a suspect is too costly ever to be used in a dragnet man-
ner. In practice, moreover, the police usually tail suspects only when
probable cause or reasonable suspicion justifies the expense."" Thus, be-
cause of the inherent limits on the pervasiveness of visual surveillance,
the collective analysis provides a rigorous justification for permitting un-
regulated visual surveillance.
The use of beepers is by and large not subject to the same restraints as
visual surveillance. 19 For example, police conducting visual surveillance
focus their efforts solely on the suspect and, because of the cost, termi-
nate surveillance whenever it appears the suspect is unlikely to reveal in-
criminating evidence. Beeper monitoring, however, is indiscriminate, be-
cause "[o]nce in place on a vehicle, it permits agents to trace the private
movements of any person who happens to ride in it, regardless of his rela-
tion to the primary investigation." 30 Furthermore, a beeper may work
long after the reasons for visual surveillance have disappeared, so more
information will be available in the aggregate.13' Finally, although govern-
ment attorneys have claimed otherwise,"32 the use of more than one
beeper in an area will not diminish the utility of the device; the police can
monitor several beepers in close quarters apparently without confusion."'3
Because there are few technological or economic restraints on the moni-
ordinarily prove to be an exceptionally inefficient and unproductive use of scarce law en-
forcement resources").
127 See D. Schultz & L. Norton, Police Operational Intelligence 122-25 (1973); A. Sutor,
Police Operations 166, 170-74 (1976).
128 See D. Schultz & L. Norton, supra note 127, at 112, 114.
129 See Marx, I'll Be Watching You: Reflections on the New Surveillance, Dissent, Winter
1985, at 26, 30 ("It has become much less expensive per unit watched, because technical
developments have dramatically altered the economics of surveillance.").
130 United States v. Bobisink, 415 F.Supp. 1334, 1338 n.6 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, vacated in part sub. nom. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
"I' See United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275, 278 (5th Cir. 1979) (transponder inserted in
airplane forgotten for 14 months; subsequent detection and investigation uncovered drug
possession). For some courts, this is a primary concern. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis,
562 F.2d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 1977) ("Law enforcement agencies should not have carte
blanche power to conduct indiscriminate surveillance for unlimited periods of time of vary-
ing numbers of individuals."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978).
12 See Supplemental Brief for the United States on Rehearing En Banc at 13 n.5., United
States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984).
122 See United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977) (agents able to monitor sev-
eral beepers in close proximity), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978); United States v. Dubrof-
sky, 581 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1978) (beeper not only allowed agents to track package but
signaled when package was opened).
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toring of beepers, self-restraint may be the only barrier to unreasonable
use. Generally, however, self-restraint is inadequate to control police con-
duct amounting to a search.13 4 Law enforcement officials pressed to solve
a crime have at times rounded up large numbers of individuals, expecting
one of them to be the perpetrator. 1 5 Politicians sometimes employ police
forces improperly to gather incriminating evidence to damage or threaten
opponents. 136 Notwithstanding the significant privacy invasion, officials
also tie into airline computers to follow an individual's movements and to
monitor his associations.' 37 In short, because police have indicated a will-
ingness to use technology to fight crime, 18s mere awareness of the possible
impropriety of their conduct is unlikely to deter government
misbehavior."39
Beeper monitoring thus has considerable potential to become wide-
spread. The most significant threat to collective privacy interests posed
by electronic surveillance is that it allows the police simultaneously to
monitor many more individuals than visual surveillance permits. "0 Ad-
"'4 The warrant requirement itself is based upon a distrust of police who in their zeal may
value too lightly and invade too quickly the privacy interests of the people they encounter.
See Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (probable cause must be determined by
a "neutral and detached magistrate," not "the officer engaged in the often competitive en-
terprise of ferreting out crime").
M See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), (police took 24 black youths to the
station for questioning and fingerprinted all but one of them in looking for a single
perpetrator).
136 See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 128-29.
137 See A. Miller, supra note 103, at 41-42 (describing use of computer to analyze airplane
travel of individuals).
I The police have made extensive use of other surveillance technology. See A. Westin,
supra note 54, at 121, 127, 130; see also President's Comm'n on Law Enforcement and Ad-
min. of Justice, National Symposium on Science and Criminal Justice 69 (1966) (describing
theoretical advances in surveillance technology).
M' There is reason to believe that law enforcement agencies would use beepers in a far
more pervasive manner than their use of visual surveillance. Federal officials now spend
large amounts on computer-based investigation methods, especially in drug cases where
beepers are a major tool. See, e.g., 1981 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 41 (describing computer ca-
pacity of the Federal Bureau of Investigation); 1979 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 47-48 (outlining
seven computer systems of the Drug Enforcement Admin.).
One example of law enforcement use of sophisticated computer systems to fight crime is
the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), which uses "the latest in computer and communica-
tions equipment" to track aircraft and sea vessels. Drug Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Fact Sheet, The Office of Intelligence 2 (Dec. 1978). In 1981, EPIC conducted over
220,000 watch transactions. Drug Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Appropria-
tions Hearings 21 (1983). Now that the military may assist EPIC in stopping drug traffic, id.
at 87, there is every indication that beeper surveillance and similar technological monitoring
will increase. EPIC portends a greater role for new technology in meeting law enforcement
needs.
110 See Marx, supra note 129, at 30 (noting that new technology makes it easier for a few
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vances in computer technology 41 and the expansion of data banks 4 may
enable the beeper to overcome any resource restraints that might exist.1
43
Although the ability of the electronic tracking device to monitor many
individuals at once is uncertain, continuing technological advances 44 sug-
gest that fourth amendment jurisprudence must begin to take account of
the potential for unprecedented privacy invasions of society as a whole
through widespread use of the beeper. 45
people to monitor many). Indeed, one court has explicitly expressed this fear. See United
States v. Bobisink, 415 F. Supp. 1334, 1339 (D. Mass. 1976) (warning of "a '1984' network of
such beepers connected to a master monitoring station which would keep track of each of
our movements for the benefit of the powers that be"), vacated, 562 F.2d 106 (1st Cir. 1977).
141 Computer technology is capable of receiving, organizing, and recording extensive
amounts of information, including reports from surveillance devices. See A. Miller, supra
note 103, at 39, 46. One example Miller offers is how a computer linked to pen registers
could analyze an individual's phone calls and determine his associations. Id. at 43. Knotts
relies on an analogy between beepers and the pen register that Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735 (1979), held was not a search. See supra note 72 and accompanying text; see also Ervin,
The First Amendment: A Living Thought in the Computer Age, 4 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev.
13, 16 (1972) (computer technology "extends the power of government a millionfold").
142 Modern data banks can help monitor an individual by quickly piecing together infor-
mation about his movements. See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 165; Holder, supra note 62, at
15-18 (explaining how computer technology threatens privacy by its efficiency).
143 The expense of large-scale beeper monitoring is difficult to ascertain. See United
States v. Devorce, 526 F. Supp. 191, 201 n.5 (D. Conn. 1981) (concluding that resource scar-
city at present does deter police dragnetting because "the beeper must be followed by air
and ground surveillance, at considerable government expense and effort"); see also Marx,
supra note 129, at 28-29 (describing experiments with large scale electronic tracking and
central receiving stations).
"' See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 81 ("Viewed as a whole, then, 'natural obstacles' are
not a major limitation on the new [beeper] surveillance.").
"I Unfortunately it is necessary to speculate on the state of the art in electronic tracking
capability. Secrecy is typical of law enforcement agencies with respect to their surveillance
activities and devices. See Note, Police Undercover Agents: New Threats to First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 37 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 634, 639 (1969) (noting the "reluctance of police
agencies to reveal the nature of their clandestine investigative efforts"). The author also
notes that Senator Edward Long had difficulty getting cooperation from federal police
agents, as did legal scholars. Id. at 639-40. The author of this note was unsuccessful in learn-
ing anything about beeper technology from Freedom of Information Act requests from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Administration. One DEA of-
ficer indicated that the agency typically removes all references to beepers from information
provided citizens under the Freedom of Information Act. Telephone interview with DEA
agent (Mar. 14, 1984) (notes on file with the Virginia Law Review Association). The agency
does not keep any aggregate records of beeper use. Thus, there is a substantial barrier to
determining what danger current beeper technology entails.
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b. The Salience of Beeper Use
If the public is unaware of or apathetic about a certain police practice,
then the practice is unlikely to create significant societal fear or anxiety.
Nevertheless, the public is apparently more sensitive to social changes
that involve technological advances than to those that involve economic
or political changes. 14 6 One study found that the public's greatest concern
regarding technology is its threat to privacy. 4"
Public attitudes toward law enforcement methods reflect this increased
awareness of technological advances. Although society is generally inter-
ested in and optimistic about "exotic applications" of science to criminal
investigations, 148 there remains a concern over the possibility that these
technologies might invade sensitive privacy interests. 49 Society has be-
come accustomed to visual surveillance and probably seldom considers
the implications of its use, yet new technologies such as beeper monitor-
ing weigh more heavily in the collective mind. Because society is more
likely to be apprehensive and anxious about technological surveillance, a
heightened scrutiny of new technological law enforcement techniques is
justified under the fourth amendment.
3. The Collective Inhibition of Individual Rights
The pervasiveness and salience of beeper monitoring poses a significant
collective threat to the three individual interests identified above. Elec-
tronic surveillance clearly encroaches upon society's informational privacy
interest more than visual surveillance does because more individuals can
and will be tracked for longer periods of time. What is more significant, a
computer analyzing information collected from extensive beeper monitor-
ing of public travel is capable of determining personal and group associa-
tions. Inferential analysis might be equally as threatening to freedom of
association as the compelled disclosure of official membership lists. Yet,
because the Knotts Court upheld electronic surveillance by characterizing
beepers as mere substitutes for permissible visual surveillance, beeper
14' See LaPorte & Metlay, Public Attitudes Toward Present and Future Technologies:
Satisfactions and Apprehensions, 5 Soc. Stud. Sci. 373, 379 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pub-
lic Attitudes]; La Porte & Metlay, Technology Observed: Attitudes of a Wary Public, 188
Science, Apr. 11, 1975, at 121; Taviss, A Survey of Popular Attitudes Toward Technology,
13 Tech. & Culture 606 (1972).
147 See Public Attitudes, supra note 146, at 385 ("Over forty percent of the sample felt
that [with regard to personal records] technology poses a definite threat to an essential civil
liberty.").
148 Note, supra note 145, at 638.
"' Public Attitudes, supra note 146, at 385.
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monitoring does not violate any first amendment right of association.1 50
Beeper monitoring threatens freedom from attention as well. Anony-
mity and solitude facilitate relaxation by freeing one from "the pressure
of playing social roles."' 51 Knowledge that one is being tracked destroys
the feeling that one is alone or unidentified. 15' Actual surveillance, how-
ever, is not necessary to chill freedom from attention. 15 3 A pervasive and
salient monitoring practice inhibits individuals from fully enjoying anony-
mity or solitude. "Wandering" or "strolling" will cease to carry the same
feelings of independence and creativity 4 if individuals are apprehensive
about being monitored by government agents using advanced technology.
Because surveillance creates a fear of social evaluation, extensive beeper
monitoring chills behavior that might be interpreted as deviant, abnor-
mal, or politically dissident.'5 5
Public knowledge of the possibility of electronic tracking also inhibits
the right to travel. 55 The right to travel, according to Justice Douglas, is
a necessary first step to ensuring the availability of many other political
rights. 5 " Even the innocent will be deterred from fully exercising this
right when they fear the government may be monitoring their travel. As
with informational privacy, if the government monitors and records an
individual's travels, that individual becomes concerned with making a
"good record." Consequently, the individual avoids traveling to certain
places or at certain times. Instances where electronic tracking of some-
one's movements leads to disgrace, resignation, or imprisonment will con-
dition others not to reveal any unconventional personal traits through
their travel. Hence, the government effectively restrains the right to
travel without resorting to impermissible rulemaking by creating fear and
anxiety over the exercise of this right.
110 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1958) (protecting con-
stitutional right of association).
151 See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 34.
152 Id. at 31 ("Knowledge or fear that one is under systematic observation in public places
destroys the sense of relaxation and freedom that men seek in open spaces and public are-
nas."(emphasis added)).
153 Askin, Surveillance: The Social Science Perpective, 4 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 59, 72
(1972).
15 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972); see supra note 118 and
accompanying text.
155 Id. at 73.
156 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969); supra notes 120-24 and accompa-
nying text.
157 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 520 (1964) (Douglas, J. concurring). See
supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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4. The Interest of Law Enforcement in Beeper Monitoring
The impact of beeper monitoring on society's sense of security must be
balanced against its utility to law enforcement agencies.15s As a means of
enforcing drug laws, the need for beepers is great.15 Moreover, given the
importance and difficulty of conventional surveillance, electronic tracking
devices are a considerable asset to law enforcement agencies. Police often
use visual surveillance when "there is no other manner available to ac-
quire the needed information, "160 and under many circumstances it turns
out to be ineffective. s1 6 Electronic tracking, on the other hand, is easily
used, allows police officers to trail at a great enough distance to avoid
detection, and enables police to relocate a lost suspect.
Accepting that beepers are valuable to law enforcement officials, the
need arises to assess the costs of bringing electronic tracking within the
ambit of the fourth amendment. Assuming that courts require the fullest
protection of a warrant before permitting beeper monitoring, the law en-
forcement costs are apparently low. That timing is typically not a prob-
lem is demonstrated by the high number of cases in which a warrant was
obtained"' or the court found that there was ample time to have ob-
'59 See Askin, supra note 153, at 70-71.
159 Only five cases have been found that did not involve a drug investigation. See United
States v. Cooper, 682 F.2d 114 (6th Cir.) (theft), cert. denied 459 U.S. 850 (1982); United
States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir. 1976) (attempted extortion from a bank president),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977); United States v. Bishop, 530 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir.) (armed
robbery), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 848 (1976); United States v. Devorce, 526 F.Supp. 191 (D.
Conn. 1981) (armed robbery); People v. Colon, 96 Misc. 2d 659, 409 N.Y.S.2d 617 (Sup. Ct.
1978) (murder).
160 D. Schultz & L. Norton, supra note 127, at 112.
161 Id. at 114.
161 Warrants were obtained to install and/or monitor beepers in a wide variety of circum-
stances. See, e.g., United States v. Henderson, 746 F.2d 619, 621 (9th Cir. 1984) (beeper
installed in a chemical container); United States v. Lee, 743 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 (8th Cir.
1984) (plane); United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 704 (9th Cir. 1983) (box of chemicals);
United States v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498, 1502 (8th Cir. 1983) (tablet press), cert. denied, 104
S. Ct. 2397 (1984); United States v. Kupper, 693 F.2d 1129, 1130-31 (5th Cir. 1982) (per
curiam) (plane); United States v. Sweeney, 688 F.2d 1131, 1142 (7th Cir. 1982) (chemical
drum); United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078, 1080 (5th Cir. 1982) (plane); United States v.
Cooper, 682 F.2d 114, 115 (6th Cir.) (package), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1982); United
States v. Ellery, 678 F.2d 674, 676 (7th Cir.) (package), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 868 (1982);
United States v. Dunn, 674 F.2d 1093, 1096 (5th Cir. 1982) (hot plate stirrer), vacated, 104
S. Ct. 2380 (1984); United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 851 (11th Cir. 1982) (plane); United
States v. Whitley, 670 F.2d 617, 618 (5th Cir. 1982) (plane); United States v. Flynn, 664 F.2d
1296, 1299 (5th Cir.) (plane), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 980 (1982); United States v. Cady, 651
F.2d 290, 291 (5th Cir. 1981) (plane), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); United States v.
Sporleder, 635 F.2d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1980) (cardboard box); United States v. Bailey, 628
F.2d 938, 939 (6th Cir. 1980) (drum); United States v. Lewis, 621 F.2d 1382, 1385 (5th Cir.)
(chemical drum), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1980); United States v. Chavez, 603 F.2d 143,
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tained one. 1 3 In cases where the police have obtained warrants, the
courts have been willing to resolve close questions in their favor.164 These
cases demonstrate the relatively low cost of imposing fourth amendment
requirements on electronic surveillance.
C. The Knotts Response to the Problem of Extensive Beeper
Monitoring: The Practicality of Waiting
In response to respondents' argument that, absent fourth amendment
regulation, beeper surveillance could possibly become widespread, the
Knotts Court stated that "the fact is that the 'reality hardly suggests
abuse.' ",65 The Court concluded that "if such dragnet type law enforce-
ment practices should eventually occur, there will be time enough then to
determine whether different constitutional principles may be applica-
145 (10th Cir. 1979) (plane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980); United States v. Reyes, 595
F.2d 275, 278 (5th Cir. 1979) (plane); United States v. Bruneau, 594 F.2d 1190, 1193 (8th
Cir.) (plane), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979); United States v. Washington, 586 F.2d 1147,
1150 (7th Cir. 1978) (package); United States v. Crowell, 586 F.2d 1020, 1027 (4th Cir. 1978)
(plane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 959 (1979); United States v. Miroyan, 577 F.2d 489, 491 (9th
Cir.) (plane), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978); United States v. Pretzinger, 542 F.2d 517,
519 (9th Cir. 1976) (plane).
103 See LaFave, supra note 63, at 428 (citing cases where time existed to get a warrant).
See, e.g., United States v. Sager, 743 F.2d 1261 (8th Cir. 1984) (applying good faith
exception of United States v. Leon, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), to uphold convictions despite
unconstitutional transponder installation); United States v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498, 1504
(8th Cir. 1983) ("We are also mindful of the fact that courts 'evince a strong preference for
searches made pursuant to a warrant, and, in some instances, may sustain them where war-
rantless searches based on a police officer's evaluation of probable cause might fail.' ")
(quoting United States v. Carlson, 697 F.2d 231, 237 (8th Cir. 1983), quoting in turn United
States v. Brown, 584 F.2d 252, 256 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979)), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2397 (1984); United States v. Cooper, 682 F.2d 114, 116 (6th Cir.) (" 'One
of the best ways to foster increased use of warrants is to give law enforcement officials the
assurance that when a warrant is obtained in a close case, its validity will be upheld.' ")
(quoting United States v. Giacalone, 541 F.2d 508, 513-14 (6th Cir. 1976)), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 850 (1982); United States v. Cady, 651 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1981) (in holding monitoring
reasonable, court focused on 17 days beeper actually used instead of 90 days warrant au-
thorized), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); see also United States v. Shovea, 580 F.2d 1382
(10th Cir. 1978) (court finding probable cause and exigent circumstances, thus excusing any
warrant requirement), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); United States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d
1322 (8th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1046 (1977).
The costs of fourth amendment regulation would be lower still if the judiciary dispensed
with the warrant requirement and required only probable cause or reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Michael, 645 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), (requiring reasonable
suspicion for vehicular monitoring), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 950 (1981); United States v.
Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977) (requiring probable cause for same), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 926 (1978).
165 460 U.S. at 283-84 (quoting Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)).
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ble.' 1 6 6 Yet, as Professor La Fave has observed, it is difficult to determine
"what reasoning would support a later conclusion that use of a beeper
against one person is no search but that its indiscriminate use against
many is."'' 6 7 Instead of addressing the potential for widespread use
through a collective notion of the fourth amendment, the Court adopts a
"wait and see" attitude by essentially ignoring the concern.
The decision to wait for abuse is unwise for several reasons. Initially,
one can question the Court's use of precedent supporting its "wait and
see" posture. The Court cited Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,16 8 where it held
permissible newsroom searches supported by a warrant. With respect to
the concern about police abuse of this practice, the Court pointed out
that the news media is quite capable of defending itself against unreason-
able police practices by publicizing police abuse.169 Newsroom searches
require warrants, and the Court could rely on magistrates to deny war-
rants in the face of publicized police abuse. But individual suspects will
not necessarily know, nor be able to prove, that they have been electroni-
cally tracked. Even assuming that an individual can prove the abuse,
there is no check on it-such as the refusal of magistrates to grant war-
rants-short of the Court overruling Knotts. °'
Second, it is inherently difficult to determine whether police are using
beeper monitoring in a dragnet fashion. Generally, law enforcement agen-
cies are not receptive to investigations into their use of surveillance tech-
niques.17 1 Defendants often have enormous difficulty discovering the
techniques police used in investigating their case.17 2 In several instances,
the government has denied that it engaged in electronic surveillance when
168 Id. at 284 (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 566 (1978)).
1'7 LaFave, supra note 63, at 1741-42.
168 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
169 Id. at 566.
170 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), might be seen as a case against police
"dragnetting." In Davis, the Court held that fingerprinting, though not a search by itself,
was impermissible when the 23 suspects to be fingerprinted were first gathered through an
impermissible round-up. In a later case the Court held: "Davis is plainly inapposite to a case
where the initial restraint does not itself infringe the Fourth Amendment." United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 11 (1973). In Dionisio, the Court held that the initial subpeona by a
grand jury was not a search, even when conducted en masse; consequently the subsequent
use of voice exemplars was not a search either. The Court thus appears to have closed the
door on any doctrine that raises nonsearch activity to the level of a search merely because it
occurs extensively.
171 See Note, supra note 145, at 638-40 (describing the difficulties of academics and others
in obtaining surveillance information from law enforcement agencies).
172 See Weidner, Discovery Techniques and Police Surveillance, 7 U.C.L.A.-Alaska L.
Rev. 190, 190 (1978) ("When working on a defense case trying to discover illegal surveil-
lance, an attorney faces a situation much like that where one finds the fox guarding the
chickenhouse.").
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in fact it had.'17 Because "this is an area where there is little utility to the
government in keeping accurate records of the fact of its electronic sur-
veillance activities," isolated examples will not prove widespread abuse.17 4
Search warrants check abuse partially by monitoring the frequency of po-
lice activity.
Third, the Knotts holding teaches lower courts addressing these issues
to engage in an analysis that ignores collective interests, permits uncon-
trolled police efficiency, and eliminates any recognition of privacy inter-
ests in public acts. Other techniques are becoming available for tracking
the movements of people in public,'75 as well as for collecting more infor-
mation about people in public or other open areas. 71 One court has al-
ready relied on Knotts in upholding the warrantless use of a nightscope
to observe a suspect walking on private property in the dark. 177 Recogniz-
ing privacy only within the walls of a private residence clearly limits the
permissible reach of the fourth amendment. 78 By focusing on the individ-
ual, however, Knotts envisions a fourth amendment that ignores how per-
vasive technological practices might become and how much collective fear
they create. Because the reasoning of Knotts supports the use of similar
technologies that together present a threat to associational freedom, ano-
nymity, solitude, and the right to travel, the most significant danger of
these technologies is the cumulative and synergistic effects of their
interaction.'7
173 Nat'l Lawyers Guild, Raising and Litigating Electronic Surveillance Claims in Crimi-
nal Cases 1-10 (1977); see also A. Westin, supra note 54, at 121 ("the [FBI's] use of elec-
tronic eavesdropping and hidden cameras goes beyond the subject areas it has admitted to
publicly").
17 Nat'l Lawyers Guild, supra note 173, at 2-21.
175 Another way to track a person's movements is to use optical scanners to read license
plates and feed the information to a computer. See A. Miller, supra note 103, at 45. This
system is used in Hong Kong to monitor the traffic flow at key intersections to allow the
government to bill citizens for road use. See A. Miller, supra note 103, at 45. Credit card use
and electronic funds transfers, when tied into computer banks, provide a "paper trail" for
investigators. See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 165; A. Miller, supra note 103, at 42.
176 See Note, Police Use of Remote Camera Systems for Surveillance of Public Streets, 4
Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 143 (1972) (discussing use of low light cameras to monitor contin-
uously a public street in Mount Vernon); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the
Fourth Amendment: The Arrival of Big Brother?, 3 Hastings Const. L.Q. 261, 266-69 (1976)
(discussing use of miniature cameras hidden so as to see through walls). After Knotts, the
use of these devices to monitor activities in public places has few boundaries.
177 See United States v. Ward, 703 F.2d 1058, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1983).
178 See A. Westin, supra note 54, at 58. Knotts apparently permits constant public sur-
veillance, if we are to take seriously the Court's statement that there is no expectation of
privacy about that which could be determined by someone in the public who "cared to
look;" and that police efficiency is always permissible.
179 The greatest threat is the interaction of beepers with all the other losses of privacy
occurring in the 1980s, some of which seem sanctioned by the Knotts opinion. The synergis-
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Finally, it will be difficult for the Court to apply fourth amendment
requirements to future beeper use. Because the Knotts standard effec-
tively lowers privacy expectations by allowing beeper monitoring of public
movements, it will become even more difficult to consider electronic sur-
veillance to be a search.180 Furthermore, along with extensive beeper
monitoring would come rationalizations for it, making it harder for a fu-
ture Court to then restrict beeper use. There is little wisdom in waiting to
address the potential of indiscriminate electronic surveillance.1 81
IV. THE STATUS OF COLLECTIVE PRIVACY RIGHTS AFTER Knotts
The collective privacy rights analysis demonstrates that focusing solely
on individuals who encounter a pervasive police practice may overlook
society's loss of security. Yet the Supreme Court, as reflected in its deci-
sions in Knotts and Karo, is reluctant to consider such analysis of elec-
tronic surveillance techniques under the fourth amendment. This section
examines under the collective privacy rights analysis three questions left
open after Knotts. Recognition of collective fourth amendment rights sig-
nificantly clarifies those issues generated by electronic surveillance.
A. Beeper Monitoring: A Possible Dragnet Exception to Knotts
Although Knotts clearly holds that the monitoring of vehicular move-
ment is not a search,"8 2 the Court, as noted, arguably creates an "abuse"
exception to this general proposition.8 3 It is possible that the Court did
not mean to create such an exception; instead, it might simply believe
that the possibility of widespread and random use of beeper monitoring is
nonexistent and may be dismissed with a perfunctory promise to deal
with the problem if it occurs.
Yet the Court may be consciously reserving judgment on truly abusive
monitoring, intending to formulate and refine an exception at a latter
time. Knotts involved beeper monitoring of only two days where the po-
tic effects may be immense. See Josephson, supra note 101, at 1599.
'80 The cumulative results will certainly lower subjective privacy expectations. See A.
Westin, supra note 54, at 101 (suggesting that the use of technology dissolves social conven-
tions against their use in privacy invasions); Marx, supra note 129, at 33 ("Once these sur-
veillance systems are institutionalized and taken for granted in a democratic society, they
can be used for harmful ends.").
"81 See A. Miller, supra note 103, at 4-5; see also id. at 123 ("It would be unwise to deal
with each new technological application on an individual basis divorced from the broader
issues, or to delay until its privacy-invading excesses have come to pass."); cf. Carter, Book
Review, 93 Yale L.J. 581, 584 n.14 (1984) ("The fact that the danger has not made itself
manifest does not mean that the danger does not exist.").
182 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
183 Id. at 284.
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lice arguably had probable cause."" Although it did not indicate that such
factors were relevant to its holding, the Court might later distinguish a
case where the monitoring was prolonged or without individualized justi-
fication. Extensive and prolonged beeper monitoring poses a substantial
threat to collective privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment.
Given the reality of Knotts, and the fact that the Court should not wait
until police abuse occurs, the best solution is to recognize a "dragnet"
exception to the principle enunciated in Knotts.
Such an exception would prohibit the warrantless monitoring of public
automobile travel when conducted in a dragnet fashion, as, for example,
where a substantial number of people are tracked without individualized
suspicion, or an individual is tracked for an extended length of time. The
collective rights analysis provides the theoretical basis for such an excep-
tion, because the extensiveness of a police practice is an important factor
in determining whether a search occurred. The cumulative effect of
beeper dragnets represents enough of a threat to collective security to
require fourth amendment protection. Although the standard for proving
police abuse under this dragnetting exception would be difficult to fash-
ion, lower courts have already begun isolating key variables in determin-
ing the reasonableness of beeper use.1 s5
184 Id. at 278. Cf. United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514, 1518 n.4 (5th Cir.) (en banc)
("[a]s did the Supreme Court in Knotts, we pretermit any ruling on worst-case situations"),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984).
"I First a defendant might charge that the extended duration of the beeper monitoring
amounted to a police dragnet. See United States v. Butts, 710 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1983)
(search warrant inadequate because warrant contained time limit of 30 days plus a 30 day
extension which was not obeyed), rev'd on other grounds on rehearing, 729 F.2d 1514 (5th
Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 181 (1984); United States v. Cofer, 444 F. Supp
146 (W.D. Tex. 1978) (warrant invalid because it contained no time limit). But see United
States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848 (11th Cir. 1982) (upholding warrant that allowed beeper use for
90 days on ground that actual time used-seven days-was reasonable); United States v.
Cady, 651 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982) (same, actual time used
was seventeen days).
Second, a defendant might invoke the dragnet exception if he knew the police were moni-
toring large numbers of people without individualized suspicion. This creates a difficult
line-drawing problem-determining how many individuals the police may monitor before
such tracking constitutes a fourth amendment search. No court has attempted to formulate
such a standard. Perhaps the courts should limit police to warrantless monitoring of only
the number of persons the police have probable cause to believe are involved in the crime.
But making this determination involves taking into consideration a myriad of variables. The
"reasonable" number of persons will vary according to the seriousness of the crime, the
suspected dangerousness of the perpetrator, the availability of other investigatory channels,
and perhaps the duration of the tracking. There may simply be no bright line number that
simultaneously provides police with the necessary discretion to pursue a reasonable tracking
strategy and eliminates the possibility of abusive dragnetting.




Karo held that installation of an electronic tracking device does not
constitute a fourth amendment search where the police obtained the con-
sent of a third party to install the device.""6 Yet the Karo opinion leaves
open the question of the fourth amendment implications of beeper instal-
lation in circumstances not involving third party consent. The inconsist-
ency of lower court cases considering more intrusive installation may re-
quire the Supreme Court to decide whether such action is a search. This
section seeks to identify the collective interests in making that decision.
Justice Steven's dissent in Karo and, implicitly, Justice Brennan's con-
currence in Knotts argue that beeper installation alone is a fourth
amendment search or seizure. 8 7 But the installation of any object prior
to a person taking possession is certainly not a search. For example, if the
police or other governmental agents installed in a vehicle an identifica-
tion tag, speed governor, or airbag, it could hardly be considered a
search. 88 Hence, under the Stevens/Brennan view there must be some-
thing in the nature of a beeper not found in these other items that causes
its installation to be a fourth amendment search. The beeper's ability to
monitor location would seem to be the relevant characteristic.
The Stevens/Brennan analysis is thus fundamentally at odds with the
holding of Knotts. Their view can be characterized as an attempt to limit
the harms of beeper monitoring through the regulation of beeper installa-
tion. Their opinions focus on the fact that the purpose and effect of in-
police investigators. Defendents will also have to rely upon uncooperative law enforcement
agencies for information to prove police abuse of beeper technology. See supra notes 145,
171-73 and accompanying text. These problems reflect the inherent limitations of the
Knotts decision, even when read to exempt abusive monitoring. As long as beeper monitor-
ing is not considered a search, there will be difficulties in formulating a standard to prove
the existence of abuse in a particular case.
186 See supra notes 13-17, 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing Karo).
1 See supra note 48 (Brennan's concurrence in Knotts); supra note 17 (Stevens' dissent
in Karo).
'" Justice Stevens argues that installation of a beeper interferes with an owner's right to
exclusive use of his own property. 104 S. Ct. at 3311. "[I]n a fundamental sense [the govern-
ment] has converted the property to its own use." Id. He concludes that the interference is
"meaningful" because "the character of the property is profoundly different when infected
with an electronic bug than when it is entirely germ free." Id.
This argument proves too much, for the government also denies exclusive use of property
when it installs a speed regulator or airbag into an automobile to facilitate its safety policies.
The government converts the property to its own use. The same could be said for the instal-
lation of a secret adhesive identification number that aids in future law enforcement. Yet
even if an owner were unaware of these devices, there is no tenable fourth amendment inter-
est in their installation. The "character of the property" changes so profoundly only because
of the beeper's capacity for subsequent monitoring.
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stallation is to facilitate monitoring. 89 Under an individual rights analy-
sis, treating installation as a proxy for monitoring is illegitimate, for
Knotts recognizes no fourth amendment interest in limiting public moni-
toring.190 The only cognizable interest is the proprietary damage created
by the beeper installation. Where the installation intrusion is slight, as in
the case of exterior attachment, the individual rights analysis perceives
no search.
The Stevens/Brennan result-weighing monitoring harms in deciding
whether installation is a search-is justified by a respect for collective
privacy rights. The individual rights analysis cannot distinguish beeper
monitoring of public movement from visual surveillance by a police of-
ficer, though the former activity threatens collective security.' 9' Despite
the apparent consistency with Knotts, Stevens and Brennan employ the
fact of installation as the means of distinguishing visual surveillance and
thereby of controlling the harms of beeper monitoring. The collective
rights analysis supports their view that any installation should trigger full
fourth amendment protection. Thus, future courts should regulate instal-
lation to the fullest extent consistent with Karo.1
92
C. The Contraband Exception
The contraband exception generally permits beeper installation and
monitoring of containers of known contraband without any fourth
amendment restraint.193 The Supreme Court has not addressed the con-
traband exception, although two recent decisions have demonstrated its
willingness to embrace the concept in other contexts. 94 The collective
189 See id.
190 Justices Brennan and Stevens might respond that given Karo, it is proper to weigh the
potential that any installation will result in monitoring of private places. This reasoning
would reconcile their installation position with Knotts' rejection of public monitoring con-
cerns only if Brennan and Stevens were concerned with installation on property potentially
hidden from visual surveillance. Visual surveillance alone reveals the location of a truck, for
example, such that installation will not result in monitoring of private places. But Stevens
seems to state that any installation is a seizure, obscuring the fact that in many cases the
only harm is public monitoring. Thus the analysis relies upon the beeper's capacity to moni-
tor, held permissible in Knotts, to argue warrantless installation is impermissible.
191 See supra text accompanying note 90.
192 Obviously Karo does not permit a holding that installation is a search where installa-
tion took place before complainant acquired the relevant property. See supra notes 12-17
and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 40.
194 See Illinois v. Andreas, 103 S. Ct. 3319, 3325 (1983) ("absent a substantial likelihood
that the contents have been changed, there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the
contents of a container previously opened under lawful authority"); Texas v. Brown, 460
U.S. 730, 739 (1983) ("requiring police to obtain a warrant once they have obtained a first-
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rights analysis provides both a sounder justification and a more focused
scope to the rule than an individual rights analysis.
The individual privacy rights explanation for the contraband rule is
that no individual may have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a good
that is possessed illegally.19 It is not clear, however, why only contraband
is made an exception,19 or why the exception should be limited to crimes
of possession. If the illegality of possession negates any reasonable pri-
vacy expectation, then the illegality of an act should also negate its rea-
sonableness. 7 This reasoning suggests that courts should not recognize
privacy expectations in acts that an individual has no legal right to com-
mit. Such an analysis would, however, be limitless, as it would apply in
every case in which the police suspect criminal behavior.,"
On the other hand, to limit the scope of the contraband exception, an
individual rights analyst might argue that a court cannot find a privacy
expectation to be unreasonable by the hindsight knowledge that the de-
fendant is guilty. This argument, however, limits the exception's scope by
denying its very justification, for the contraband exception in fact judges
a defendant's expectation unreasonable because hindsight proves his
guilt. For example, when the beeper is installed, and for at least part of
the time it is monitored, the police do not even know who they will arrest,
much less who will be convicted. The individual rights analysis strains to
explain why the police can always use a beeper in contraband cases, but
can never wiretap a private phone conversation no matter how certain
they are as to the defendant's guilt. At best, the courts are making very
fine distinctions of degree.
hand perception of contraband . . . would be a 'needless inconvenience' "). In Brown, the
Court held that a policeman's seizure of a party balloon from defendant's hand after seeing
plastic vials, loose white powder, and more balloons in his glove compartment, was justified
under the plain view doctrine. Id. Andreas permitted the warrantless reopening of a
container previously opened under a lawful customs inspection and found to contain mari-
juana. 103 S. Ct. at 3325.
19 See, e.g., United States v. Pringle, 576 F.2d 1114, 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) (there is "no
legitimate expectation of privacy in substances which [people] have no right to possess at
all"); United States v. Emery, 541 F.2d 887, 889-90 (1st Cir. 1976) (the beeper was "inserted
into a package containing contraband, property which he had no right to possess").
"' United States v. Knotts, 662 F.2d 515, 519-20 (Henley, J., dissenting in part) (8th Cir.
1981) ("The rationale and policy considerations underlying the contraband exception can
safely be applied to certain non-contraband items."), rev'd, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
197 See United States v. Brock, 667 F.2d 1311, 1320 n.9 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103
S. Ct. 1271 (1983) ("Would the warrantless physical search of a residence be reasonable
because the occupants had no 'legitimate' expectation of privacy in the heroin they kept in
the house?").
198 W. LaFave, supra note 10, § 2.7, at 426 (arguing that the contraband exception is at
odds with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), because arguably there is no "legiti-
mate" privacy expectation in illegal communications).
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The collective rights approach reveals a more sustantial distinction be-
tween the possession of contraband and other criminal acts. The distinc-
tion has nothing to do with expectations of privacy regarding illegal acts
or possessions. Rather, the contraband exception is justified because the
police practice will generate minimal societal insecurity. First, the prac-
tice is limited to cases where the police lawfully intercept a package and
determine with practical certainty that it contains contraband, 19 thus
limiting its potential pervasiveness. Second, the practice is unlikely to be
particularly salient to the public, because the salience of a search proba-
bly turns on whether or not the police discover proof of criminality. When
a neighbor's house is searched and incriminating evidence found, society
takes solace in the fact that the police only search criminals. When police
search an innocent neighbor, however, the psychological cost to society in
terms of its feeling of security is much more significant. Because the po-
lice will make few search mistakes in controlled deliveries of goods they
have established to be contraband, "searches" involving beepers probably
will not generate much societal fear or anxiety.
This collective justification better defines the scope of the contraband
exception. The use of the exception under the collective analysis should
be limited to circumstances where the police will commit few errors, and
hence public salience is likely to remain low. The exception, therefore,
should not be expanded to include noncontraband items, nor items that
are merely suspected of being contraband, for such a step would greatly
increase the pervasiveness and salience of the warrantless police practice.
So although the collective rights analysis provides a means of justifying
the contraband exception it does not support a practice where the police
are always justified in violating privacy expectations of those strongly be-
lieved to be engaged in criminal activity.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court traditionally has examined the extent to which a
police practice intrudes on individual privacy interests in determining
whether that practice constitutes a fourth amendment search. Yet the na-
ture of conventional surveillance techniques prevents their widespread
and random application. Such practices therefore pose little threat to col-
lective privacy interests.
On the other hand, because of its efficiency, technological surveillance
endangers collective security despite its limited intrusion on a given indi-
vidual. The collective privacy rights analysis is useful in evaluating the
pervasiveness of a police practice and its impact on societal interests. By
199 See supra note 40.
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ignoring this analysis in Knotts, the Court overlooked an important com-
ponent of fourth amendment privacy. It is incumbent on the Court to
apply the collective rights analysis when addressing the fourth amend-
ment implications of police use of modern surveillance technologies.
R.H.M.

